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In 1998, Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler published 
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, one of the most 
important pieces of scholarship in decades. Their article famously 
proposes a departure from the neoclassical law and economics
approach to legal analysis. Breaking from neoclassical law and 
economics’ rational actor construct, the authors apply empirical 
insights about human behavior to introduce the concept of a boundedly 
rational actor limited by cognitive constraints. Over the past two 
decades, the behavioral law and economics approach, with its focus on 
the boundedly rational actor, has contributed needed realism to legal 
analyses.
Unfortunately, the current approach to behavioral law and economics 
is incomplete. Indeed, sometimes it even conflicts with empirical lessons 
about how the brain actually works. In particular, rationality is not 
independent of policy but instead has a malleable character that can be 
molded in long-lasting ways over time by specific laws and policies. By 
overlooking the malleable nature of rationality, behavioral law and 
economics cannot reach its full potential, and in fact, may harm the very 
people it is intended to benefit. A policy enacted to preserve consumer 
autonomy, for instance, may actually undermine autonomous decision-
making in the long term.
In this Article, I take the first step in remedying this oversight. Drawing 
on the insights of neuroscience, I explain why rationality is not 
independent of policy and what this means for behavioral law and 
economics. Working from examples in advertising and criminal law, I 
explain that malleable rationality can and should be accounted for. 
Doing so will increase the prescriptive and normative power of 
behavioral law and economics, and prevent policies from being 
introduced that undermine rather than advance social welfare.
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I. INTRODUCTION
How do people behave in the real world and what does it mean for law? 
That question has prompted a fierce debate. Scholars like Ronald Coase and 
Richard Posner have championed the neoclassical law and economics approach 
that has dominated legal scholarship for decades.1 The approach assumes that 
                                                                                                                     
1 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Law and Economics: Its Glorious Past and Cloudy 
Future, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1167, 1168 (1997); Anne C. Dailey, Striving for Rationality, 86 
VA. L. REV. 349, 351 (2000) (reviewing JONATHAN LEAR, OPEN MINDED: WORKING OUT
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people behave completely rationally—that they have unlimited capacity to 
process choice-relevant information and that, after processing this information, 
they will invariably choose the option that maximizes their personal utility.2
More recently, however, the behavioral law and economics model, backed by 
Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and others, has been gaining traction. It uses 
behavioral research to show how people are “boundedly rational.”3 According 
to behavioral law and economics, real people suffer from cognitive limitations 
and are unable to process all relevant information when making a choice.4 And 
even if they could discern the utility-maximizing path, behavioral economists 
explain that actors often do not choose this option for a variety of predictable 
reasons.5
For all the reasons identified by Jolls and Sunstein, behavioral law and 
economics is a welcome advance over neoclassical law and economics and a 
more realistic way to conduct legal analyses.6 But it is far from perfect. To the 
contrary, both it and neoclassical rationality models largely ignore the fact that 
people’s brains change with experience over time.7 In the language of 
neuroscience, this is known as plasticity,8 and it has major implications for 
rationality. First, it means that rationality—whether neoclassical or bounded—
is not independent of policy, but depends on the particular experiences we create 
for citizens through our policy choices. Relatedly, it means we can expect 
                                                                                                                     
THE LOGIC OF THE SOUL (1998)); see also Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (1998) (noting that criticisms of law and 
economics are “almost as old as the field itself”).
2 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3–4 (6th ed. 2003). 
3 See Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1477–78.
4 Id. at 1477.
5 See id. at 1479 (discussing bounded willpower). 
6 See id. at 1473–74. But see Gregory Mitchell, Alternative Behavioral Law and 
Economics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 183, 184 
(Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds. 2014) (“Until significant changes are made to move 
[behavioral law and economics] toward empirically tested, domain-specific prescriptions, 
there is little reason to believe that [its] prescriptions will be more effective than those offered 
by [neoclassical law and economics].”); William H.J. Hubbard, Quantum Economics,
Newtonian Economics, and Law 6, 36–37 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Coase-Sandor Inst. for 
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 799, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2926548
[https://perma.cc/553K-CMH3] (arguing that neoclassical and behavioral law and 
economics approaches are more similar to each other than often portrayed and that Coase in 
particular endorsed a more realistic view of human behavior than he is often credited for). 
7 See Owen D. Jones, Why Behavioral Economics Isn’t Better, and How It Could Be
10 (Vanderbilt Law Sch., Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 14-30, 2014), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2504776 [https://perma.cc/G52Y-S48J] (forthcoming 2018 in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS) (claiming that behavioral law and economics should 
be concerned with “When?” questions such as how biases and heuristics may change over 
time, with experience, age, or training).
8 Frank W. Stahnisch & Robert Nitsch, Santiago Ramón y Cajal’s Concept of 
Neuronal Plasticity: The Ambiguity Lives On, 25 TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCE 589, 589–90 
(2002).
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characteristics of individual decision-making to change in long-lasting ways 
over time as people live with these policies. Hence, rationality itself—not just 
preferences, and not just irrelevant features of decision-making, but individual 
decision-making capacity—is malleable. Behavioral law and economics 
proponents have been rightly concerned with how policy should respond to the 
fact of bounded rationality. But they have failed to recognize that bounded 
rationality will respond in turn to whatever policies we enact. 
Due to the malleable character of rationality, a policy passed at time A will 
have long-term psychological and physiological effects on a governed person.9
She will be changed by her experiences in a world with that policy.10 This 
change, whatever it is, may make it either more or less likely that she will be 
capable of acting in rational ways in response to the same or different policies 
much later, at time B. This is so not just because (as neoclassical and behavioral 
law and economics scholars have recognized)11 her preferences may have 
changed, or even because (as behavioral law and economics scholars have 
recognized)12 irrelevant features of the decision that differ from time A to time 
B might affect her thinking as a boundedly rational actor. It is because her 
inherent capacity for rational thinking has been molded in long-lasting ways by 
the policies enacted at time A.13 To use the language of bounded rationality, a 
policy choice at time A might have instilled in our citizen particular long-lasting 
biases14 that simply would not have existed had that choice not been made. Or 
she might express certain biases—again, in a “sticky” and long-lasting way—to 
a greater or lesser degree than she would have otherwise.15 In some cases, our 
policy inputs at time A will enhance people’s abilities to act in desired ways at 
time B.16 In other cases, they might undermine people’s later ability to respond 
to laws in the way we expect or want them to.17
                                                                                                                     
9 See, e.g., Jacob Goldin, Essay, Which Way To Nudge? Uncovering Preferences in 
the Behavioral Age, 125 YALE L.J. 226, 229, 231 (2015) (describing the ways that 
government policies can affect rational decision-making).
10 See id. 
11 See Chrisoula Andreou, Dynamic Choice, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 2, 
2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dynamic-choice/ [https://perma.cc/S8AC-29DW] 
(describing the “dynamic choice problem” wherein people are imperfect at predicting their 
future preferences).
12 See, e.g., Goldin, supra note 9, at 240?41.
13 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974).
14 See id.
15 See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing 
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1112 (2000) 
(describing the effect of the status quo bias which causes contracting persons to adhere more 
closely to default rules in a transaction).
16 See, e.g., Goldin, supra note 9, at 229, 231 (noting that government policies could
“nudge” citizens’ choices in directions that could improve their welfare, such as putting 
health warnings on cigarettes).
17 See id. at 229–30.
2018] MALLEABLE RATIONALITY 21
Whatever the ultimate outcome, the point is that rationality depends on 
policy. Policy decisions today have real consequences, not just for the decisions 
people make or the preferences they exhibit tomorrow, but for their inherent 
capacity to make these decisions—for the particular flavor of rationality they 
exhibit in the future. If we are serious in our quest to design legal institutions in 
ways that are likely to elicit the desired responses of real rather than hypothetical 
people, this is a reality that needs to be accounted for, especially if we wish to 
avoid unintended consequences. A policy enacted to preserve consumer 
autonomy, for instance, may—due to the lasting effects on the brains of people 
living with the policy—actually undermine autonomous decision-making in the 
long term.18 And policies that determine income distribution and exposure to 
various types of media may hamper efforts in the seemingly unrelated area of 
criminal deterrence.19
Despite the potential complexity a malleable model of rationality 
introduces, we can at least begin to account for its intricacies. Bounded 
rationality works as a model of behavior because people depart from rational 
behavior in predictable and empirically measurable ways.20 Likewise with 
malleable rationality. Neuroscience and behavior studies are beginning to show 
how specific policies change people’s decision-making capacity in the long 
term.21 If we can predict, based on empirical research, how rationality will 
change in response to a given policy, we can account for it. And we should.
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows. Part II explores our evolving 
understanding of human behavior and how decision-making models have grown 
more sophisticated by incorporating behavioral empirical research into a 
concept of the boundedly rational actor. In Part III, I argue that it’s time to take 
the next step and recognize that rationality is a malleable quality grounded in 
the neuroscientific concept of neuroplasticity. After introducing the concept of 
malleable rationality, I use examples from criminal and advertising law to 
illustrate how a failure to account for malleable rationality can lead to ineffective 
and even counter-productive policy making. In Part IV, I move from the specific 
to the general and explore the broad implications of the phenomenon for law 
and policy analyses.
II. RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND ITS LIMITS
To analyze the effects of specific laws and policies, we need to have some 
idea of how people—its targets—will respond to them. Here, I explore law’s
evolving understanding of human behavior, from neoclassical rationality to the 
                                                                                                                     
18 See infra Part III.B.2.
19 See infra Part III.B.1.
20 See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR 
DECISIONS (2008) (describing how people depart from rational behavior in predictable 
ways).
21 See Jones, supra note 7, at 23–28 (explaining how neuroscience can enrich the 
behavioral law and economics approach).
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more complex and behaviorally accurate bounded rationality. In doing so, I set 
the stage for taking the next step toward a malleable understanding of 
rationality.
A. Rationality
The law and economics movement came to prominence in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s22 and for at least two decades enjoyed status as a (perhaps the)
dominant mode of legal analysis.23 Law and economics concerns itself with the 
efficiency of legal rules.24 It posits that legal rules have efficiency 
consequences—the potential to either enhance or undermine social welfare—
and that these consequences should be considered when formulating the rules.25
The efficiency implications of legal rules flow in part from governed 
individuals’ response to these rules.26 Law and economics proposes that people 
respond to legal rules in ways that are either socially beneficial or socially 
detrimental.27 A task of the approach is to formulate rules that encourage the 
socially beneficial behaviors and discourage the socially detrimental ones.28
But how can we predict how people will respond to legal rules? Enter the 
rational actor.29 Neoclassical law and economics presumes that people will 
behave rationally when presented with an incentive or otherwise called on to 
make a choice.30 They will choose the alternative that maximizes their own 
expected utility.31 Inherent in this presumption is an assumption about how 
                                                                                                                     
22 Epstein, supra note 1, at 1167–68. 
23 See Paul H. Rubin, Law and Economics, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECON. (2008), 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/LawandEconomics.html [https://perma.cc/GR3X-NM8R].
24 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Principles of Fairness Versus Human 
Welfare: On the Evaluation of Legal Policy 2 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & 
Bus., Discussion Paper No. 277, 2000), https://ssrn.com/abstract=224946 [https://perma.cc/
NX3K-6PRT].
25 See id. at 3?4 (arguing that economic analyses of law that focus on human welfare 
are superior to noneconomic fairness-based policy approaches); see also Korobkin & Ulen, 
supra note 15, at 1054.
26 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 15, at 1055 (“Law and economics is, at root, a 
behavioral theory, and therein lies its true power. The concern of law and economics with 
how actors in and subject to the legal system respond to legal directives (and would respond 
to hypothesized changes in those directives) now permeates the mainstream of legal 
academic thought . . . .”).
27 See id. at 1054.
28 See id.
29 See William M. Wiecek, The Opening of American Law: Neoclassical Legal 
Thought, 1870–1970—Herbert Hovenkamp, 33 L. & HIST. REV. 1017, 1018 (2015) (book 
review) (describing how pioneering economists such as William Stanley Jevons conceived 
of economic relationships in terms of the rational actor).
30 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 15, at 1063.
31 Id. 
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people process information.32 The theory assumes that actors will be able to 
perfectly process all available information and accurately discern the utility-
maximizing choice.33 A chief advantage of rational choice theory is its relative 
simplicity, which facilitates its application in a variety of legal contexts.34
Consider, for example, how the notion of the rational actor informs the 
general deterrence model of criminal punishment. According to the simplest 
neoclassical law and economics version of the model, John, a hypothetical, 
rational citizen contemplating a criminal act, will balance the utility he expects 
to gain from his transgression against the disutility he will experience if caught 
and punished, weighted by the probability of being caught.35 The 
straightforward (in theory, if not in practice) goal of the criminal justice system 
under this model is to administer punishments unpleasant enough and frequent 
enough to tip John’s cost-benefit analysis in favor of lawful behavior.36
Making use of economic models that incorporate the presumption of 
rational choice, law and economics scholars have achieved great successes in 
the major legal disciplines.37 But after the low-hanging fruit of the law and 
economics approach was largely gathered in,38 scholars began arguing that the 
time was ripe for moving beyond rational choice theory’s simplified 
assumptions about human motivations and cognitive capacities. In 1989, for 
example, Robert Ellickson asserted that it was time to “enrich” the simplified 
rational actor model with insights from psychology and sociology about the 
complexity of human behavior.39 Ellickson pointed out that, by that time, the 
assumptions of rational choice theory had long been known to be incorrect (or 
                                                                                                                     
32 See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A 
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 23 (1989).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 24.
35 Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1538; Richard A. Posner, Bentham’s Influence on the Law 
and Economics Movement, 51 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 425, 431 (1998). 
36 See David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1626 
(1992) (discussing deterrence). 
37 See Ellickson, supra note 32, at 24 (stating in 1989 that “[t]he first generation of law 
and economics scholars has essentially accomplished the straightforward applications of the 
basic economic model in virtually every field”); Epstein, supra note 1, at 1170–71 (speaking 
of the “enormous and rapid advances in the field, which had much virgin territory to 
conquer,” and the application of law and economics models to “legal and policy questions 
of major importance”); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 15, at 1053–54 (“The [law and 
economics] movement’s vast initial successes were so sweeping that the current pliers of the 
trade have been forced to search for more narrow niches to fill.”).
38 See references cited supra note 37.
39 Ellickson, supra note 32, at 23. As Ellickson points out, Arthur Leff made the same 
argument fifteen years earlier, in 1974. Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some 
Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 470–77 (1974). But Ellickson asserts that 
Leff’s argument, if correct, was premature due to the value to be gained from the simplified 
rational choice model. Ellickson, supra note 32, at 24. In 1989, Ellickson’s view is that this 
value has largely been attained, and that it is now time to revisit Leff’s argument. Id. at 24–
25. 
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at least incomplete)40 and argued that more realistic models of human behavior 
could enhance both the “explanatory power and normative punch” of 
neoclassical economic models.41
B. Bounded Rationality
Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler responded to Ellickson’s
call for added realism in the law and economics methodology. In a 1998 article, 
they pointed to the burgeoning field of behavioral economics and argued for a 
similar movement in legal analysis—a law and behavioral economics
approach.42 Their article builds on the foundational behavioral work of Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky (which itself grew from the earlier ideas of 
Herbert Simon) identifying ways in which people depart from pure rationality 
in their decision-making.43
Key to Jolls and colleagues’ proposition is the concept of “bounded 
rationality,”44 a term first coined by Simon.45 Bounded rationality challenges 
the major assumptions of rational choice theory. First, it takes issue with the 
theory’s supposition that actors can perfectly process any and all information 
                                                                                                                     
40 Ellickson, supra note 32, at 23.
41 Id. Ellickson’s proposition was not without its detractors. Most notably, Ellickson 
points to Richard Posner, a champion of the law and economics approach. Id. Throughout 
the 1980s, Posner insisted that the continued use of neoclassical law and economics’
simplified assumptions was warranted and that psychology had not done much to enrich 
legal analysis. Id. at 24; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15–16 
(3d ed. 1986) (arguing for the continued viability of rational choice theory’s simplified 
assumptions); Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962–
87, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 769 (1987) (arguing that psychology and sociology had not 
realized their promise to “improve[] our understanding of law”).
42 Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1474.
43 See id. at 1477; Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and 
Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 
1037–39 (2012). For examples of Kahneman and Tversky’s foundational literature, see 
Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase 
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect 
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) [hereinafter 
Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory]; Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, 
Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS 
AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 
2002); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency 
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 13.
For examples of Simon’s work, see Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational 
Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99 (1955); Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business 
Organizations, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 493 (1979).
44 Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1477–78.
45 See NICOLAI J. FOSS & PETER G. KLEIN, ORGANIZING ENTREPRENEURIAL JUDGMENT:
A NEW APPROACH TO THE FIRM 232 (2012) (quoting Simon for the proposition that 
“boundedly rational agents experience limits in formulating and solving complex problems 
and in processing (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) information”).
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that comes their way.46 Instead, bounded rationality theory proposes that real 
people are limited in their cognitive abilities: that they attend selectively (rather 
than comprehensively) to information inputs, that they remember imperfectly 
the information they do take in, and that they are subject to biases when they 
process this information in the course of decision-making.47
Behavioral research has shown that these cognitive limitations can lead to 
systematic errors in judgments relevant to utility calculations.48 To return to our 
aspiring criminal John, for instance, it is likely that he, like the rest of us, suffers 
from “present bias,” a tendency to discount future consequences and give undue 
weight to present rewards.49 John’s bias has obvious consequences for the 
general deterrence model of punishment. Specifically, he will tend to 
overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs of crime, making it more 
likely that he will choose to commit a crime where a purely rational actor would 
not.50 For the general deterrence model to work as expected, then, we need to 
take John’s bounded rationality into account in deciding the appropriate 
duration and frequency of punishment.51 Likewise, additional empirically 
documented biases and heuristics have implications for myriad other legal 
theories initially built on a foundation of absolute rationality.52
The discussion to this point suggests that even if individuals want to choose 
the option that will maximize their own utility, they may be unable, due to 
cognitive limitations, to discern what the utility-maximizing choice is.53 The 
present bias, for example, may (mis)lead John to underestimate the disutility he 
                                                                                                                     
46 Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1477.
47 See, e.g., Bruce Chapman, Rational Choice and Categorical Reason, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1169, 1170 (2003); Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1477–78; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 
15, at 1075–83; Fred S. McChesney, Behavioral Economics: Old Wine in Irrelevant New 
Bottles?, 21 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 51 (2014).
48 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 15, at 1085.
49 Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1538–39. 
50 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A 
Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 174 (2004); William 
Spelman, The Severity of Intermediate Sanctions, 32 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 107, 113 
(1995) (reporting that criminal offenders judged a five-year sentence to be only twice as
negative as a one-year sentence).
51 See Posner, supra note 35, at 431. 
52 See, e.g., Deven R. Desai, Bounded by Brands: An Information Network Approach 
to Trademarks, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821, 828 (2014) (applying the insights of bounded 
rationality to trademark law); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form 
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003) (examining how 
bounded rationality bears on various contract doctrines); Gregory Mitchell, Mapping 
Evidence Law, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1065, 1082 (2003) (discussing the implications of 
bounded rationality for evidence law); Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 
U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 250 (2006) (analyzing borrowing law and policy in light of bounded 
rationality insights); Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market 
Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 560 (2002) (discussing the implications 
of bounded rationality for market entry analyses). 
53 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 15, at 1077.
26 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 79:1
will experience from punishment, and commit a crime when it is not in his best 
interest to do so.54
But bounded rationality also challenges rational choice theory’s other major 
assumption: that individuals able to discern the utility-maximizing option will, 
when given the choice, invariably choose this route.55 In fact, as Jolls and 
colleagues explain (again drawing from the work of Kahneman, Tversky, and 
others), actors often do not choose the utility-maximizing option for a variety of 
reasons.56
Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory, a prominent alternative to 
expected utility theory, for instance, explains how reference points matter: 
people make decisions based on the expected outcome relative to a starting 
reference point rather than on the absolute utility or disutility of the outcome.57
If John’s starting point is destitution, for example, he may value the gains to be 
had from robbing a bank much more highly than someone who lives in relative 
comfort, though the absolute gains remain the same for each person.58
Individuals may also engage in “satisficing” behaviors, intentionally opting 
not to seek additional relevant information that would help them discern the 
utility-maximizing choice, and instead settling for a satisfactory (but not 
optimal) course of action.59 They may be constrained from following what they 
know to be the utility-maximizing route by their own limited willpower.60 And 
behavioral work has shed light on other biases and effects showing how we 
frequently make decisions for reasons other than utility-maximization.61
Examples include emotional effects (where decisions are made for emotional 
rather than intellectual reasons),62 impulse effects (where clearly suboptimal 
                                                                                                                     
54 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 50, at 179–80. 
55 Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1477–78.
56 Id. 
57 Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199,
205 (2006) (discussing prospect theory); Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 
43, at 277. 
58 See Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 43, at 277 (“An essential 
feature of [prospect] theory is that the carriers of value are changes in wealth or welfare, 
rather than final states.”).
59 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 15, at 1075–77. The concept of satisficing was also 
introduced by Herbert Simon, Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Decision-Making in Economics 
and Behavioral Science, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 253, 262–65 (1959), and has since been 
validated empirically. See Barry Schwartz et al., Maximizing Versus Satisficing: Happiness 
Is a Matter of Choice, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1178, 1178 (2002); Itamar 
Simonson & Aner Sela, On the Heritability of Consumer Decision Making: An Exploratory 
Approach for Studying Genetic Effects on Judgment and Choice, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 951, 
951, 956 (2011). 
60 Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1479 (giving the example of a person who would rather 
not smoke, but is prevented by her own limited willpower from stopping).
61 See McChesney, supra note 47, at 49–50.
62 Id. at 49. 
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decisions are made on impulse),63 and the status-quo bias (where actors prefer 
the status quo even when a low-cost change would enhance utility).64
One way to characterize the major advance of behavioral law and 
economics is its recognition of how seemingly irrelevant variables affect 
decision-making.65 According to rational choice theory, factors like the way in 
which a decision is framed, a decision-maker’s reference point, or how she is 
feeling at the time of a choice simply have no bearing on the path the 
decision-maker will take: they are irrelevant to the utility-maximization 
calculation.66 Behavioral law and economics, in contrast, recognizes that these 
types of factors do influence decision-making and has begun to characterize 
precisely how they do so.67
According to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, bounded rationality should be used 
as a basis for more realistic positive descriptions of human behavior and 
decision-making.68 Because behavioral experiments show that people depart 
from rationality in predictable ways due to features of the choice that were 
previously deemed irrelevant, we can incorporate these departures into models 
of behavior.69 And because we are modeling behavior, bounded rationality 
theory should lead to testable predictions that are either borne out, or not, by 
behavior in real market situations—behavior that is currently not adequately 
predicted by the assumptions of conventional economics.70
                                                                                                                     
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See Goldin, supra note 9, at 231 (characterizing the insights of behavioral law and 
economics as actors making decisions “based on . . . preference-irrelevant feature[s] of the 
decision”).
66 See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 15, at 1069 (“[A]ll but the thinnest versions 
of rational choice theory assume that decision makers conduct a cost-benefit analysis that is 
invariant to factors external to their choice . . . .”). But see Richard A. Posner, Rational 
Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1551–52 (1998) 
(stating that neoclassical economic analysis of law “long ago abandoned the model of 
hyperrational, emotionless, unsocial, supremely egoistic, nonstrategic man (or woman) that 
[critics] in places appear to ascribe to it” (footnote omitted)).
67 E.g., Mitchell, supra note 6, at 169 (describing how the boundedly rational actor of 
behavioral law and economics “open[s] himself up to fleeting influences of the situation, 
such as attention-grabbing information, the manner in which choices are presented, and how 
filling his breakfast was”); Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of 
Law, 4 HAIFA L. REV. 237, 260–63 (2008) (describing how framing, reference points, and 
loss aversion can influence decision-makers at the point of decision). 
68 Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1478.
69 See id. at 1474 (“The unifying idea in [a behavioral law and economic] analysis is 
that behavioral economics allows us to model and predict behavior relevant to the law with 
the tools of traditional economic analysis, but with more accurate assumptions about human 
behavior . . . .”).
70 Id. at 1481–85. 
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It is probably no exaggeration to say that the behavioral law and economics 
movement has transformed legal thinking71—legal scholars now routinely refer 
to bounded rationality and rely on other behavioral concepts,72 and law students 
are increasingly exposed to these ideas.73 President Obama even established a 
Social and Behavioral Sciences Team (SBST) to apply behavioral scientific 
insights to questions of policy.74
But despite its successes, not everyone has accepted behavioral law and 
economics wholesale. Immediately after publishing their 1998 article, Jolls, 
Sunstein, and Thaler received pushback in the form of several responses. 
Predictably, some of this pushback came from neoclassical law and economics 
scholars. Richard Posner, for example, while conceding that “law can benefit 
from [the] insights [of behavioral economics],”75 describes Jolls and colleagues’
approach as “ad hoc,” and opines that many of their insights are already a part 
of, or could be handled by, neoclassical law and economics theory.76 A second 
notable response at the other end of the spectrum came from Mark Kelman, who, 
while not unsympathetic to the ideas motivating behavioral law and economics, 
cautions that Jolls and colleagues’ approach suffers from some of the same 
shortcomings as neoclassical law and economics.77 Chief among these 
shortcomings, according to Kelman, is the authors’ failure to recognize that 
behavioral law and economics, despite its enhanced realism and complexity, is 
                                                                                                                     
71 See Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and 
Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1595 (2014) (“Behavioral law and economics (BLE) has been 
broadly regarded in recent years as among the most promising and exciting new 
developments in public policymaking theory and practice.”).
72 See Grant M. Hayden & Stephen E. Ellis, Law and Economics After Behavioral 
Economics, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 629, 630 (2007) (describing the impact of behavioral 
economics on legal scholarship); Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 1034–35 (discussing 
the impact on regulatory policy making). 
73 Maurice E. Stucke, Foreword: The Rise of Behavioral Economics, 13 TRANSACTIONS
309, 309–10 (2012). 
74 About SBST, SBST, https://sbst.gov/#work [https://perma.cc/752K-QHY5]. The fate 
of the SBST under the current Trump administration is unclear, but scholars have speculated 
that it is now defunct. See Tiago Mata, Automatic for the People, FIRST 100 DAYS (May 4, 
2017), http://first100days.stsprogram.org/2017/05/04/automatic-for-the-people/ [https://perma.cc/
3T8P-83LC] (“Predictably, [SBST] was an early candidate for Trump’s ‘you’re fired,’ and 
their website now bears the disclaimer that its contents are ‘historical material “frozen in 
time” on January 20, 2017.’”). 
75 Posner, supra note 66, at 1551. 
76 Id. at 1552 (“Some of the insights [Jolls and colleagues] ascribe to behavioral 
economics are already a part of economic analysis of law . . . . Other points they make are 
new labels for old challenges to the economic model of behavior . . . .”); see also Christine 
Jolls et al., Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelman, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 
1593–94 (1998) (replying to Posner’s criticisms). For an argument similar to Posner’s made 
over fifteen years later, see McChesney, supra note 47, at 46 (“[S]ome of what behavioral 
economics claims to bring to the table has in fact been on the table for some time, and . . .
much of what has been missing from the table is mostly irrelevant.”). 
77 Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A Response to 
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1577, 1578–79 (1998). 
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still, like neoclassical law and economics, merely an “interpretive trope”—one 
of many ways to approach a complex and ambiguous data set—rather than a 
“full-blown verifiable or falsifiable theor[y].”78
Additional critiques of behavioral law and economics and bounded 
rationality theory have emerged over time. Some are grounded in empirical 
work;79 others worry about the lack of a “unifying theory” in behavioral law and 
economics;80 still others contend that the approach insufficiently accounts for 
cultural influences on behavior.81
Though behavioral law and economics has not been spared its share of 
scrutiny and critique, the conversation has overlooked a crucial shortcoming of 
the theory. This is the fact that bounded rationality is not static, nor is it 
independent of previous policy choices. I address this shortcoming here.
III. MALLEABLE RATIONALITY
The law and behavioral economics movement represents an important 
advance in our understanding of human decision-making. But it fails to 
adequately incorporate an important reality: the fact that our brains, and 
therefore our decision-making capacity, change with experience over time. This 
insight is grounded in the neuroscientific concept of neuroplasticity. In this Part, 
I introduce the concept of neuroplasticity and describe how it pertains to positive 
descriptions of decision-making through the workings of malleable rationality. 
I then explore three examples from criminal and advertising law that illustrate 
why it is so crucial that we take the phenomenon of malleable rationality into 
                                                                                                                     
78 Id. at 1579; see also Jolls et al., supra note 76, at 1605–08 (replying to Kelman’s
criticisms). In their reply, the authors push back against Kelman’s characterization of 
behavioral law and economics as just one of many available tools for analyzing and 
interpreting human behavior. Id. at 1607. Though admitting that their theory is currently 
incomplete (pending more empirical research), they express optimism that behavioral law 
and economics is a theory that will lead to tangible improvements in law and policy. Id. at 
1608.
79 See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be 
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 76 (2002) 
(discussing empirical evidence emphasizing the variability and situational dependence of 
specific irrational behaviors and proposing a middle road between rational choice theory and 
bounded rationality theory that is more firmly grounded in the empirical literature).
80 See Hubbard, supra note 6, at 38–40; see also Hayden & Ellis, supra note 72, at 630–
33 (arguing that the lack of a unified theory leads to inconsistent explanations for behavior 
and proposing an alternative “top-down” approach that recognizes that people often make 
decisions based on only a narrow subset of their beliefs); Mitchell, supra note 6, at 169 
(describing our current understanding of behavioral law and economics as “only a sketch”).
81 See Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on 
Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1072?73 (2006) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF 
FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005)). But see Cass R. Sunstein, 
Misfearing: A Reply, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1110, 1111 (2006) (replying to Kahan et al. and 
arguing that what the authors refer to as “cultural cognition” is in fact a product of bounded 
rationality).
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account. If we do not, our positive descriptions of choice behavior will be 
incorrect, which will in turn lead to suboptimal and at times even 
counterproductive policy making. We may, for example, enact seemingly 
unrelated policies that will hinder criminal deterrence efforts. Or we may enact 




Neuroplasticity refers to physical changes that take place in the brain over 
a person’s lifetime.82 These changes may occur on different physiological 
levels, from alterations in individual brain cells (called neurons), to the growth 
of new neurons, to changes in connectivity among networks of neurons.83
Why and when does neuroplasticity occur? Often, it is precipitated by a 
person’s experience with the outside world.84 When we learn something new, 
that learning is reflected in physical changes to the brain.85 By learning to play 
the piano, for example, we strengthen particular connections in the brain in
regions associated with sensory processing and motor performance.86
Perhaps not surprisingly, the brain is at its most plastic when we are 
young.87 During this time, the brain is rapidly developing and connections 
among neurons are alternately forming and being pruned away in accordance 
with our particular set of experiences.88 This period of early brain development 
tapers off in intensity over time and is largely complete by the time a person 
                                                                                                                     
82 See Stahnisch & Nitsch, supra note 8, at 589–90 (discussing the definition and 
origins of the term).
83 See id. at 590 (discussing the phenomenon of “axonal reorganization” (connectivity 
changes) in the brain); see also Bogdan Draganski et al., Neuroplasticity: Changes in Grey 
Matter Induced by Training, 427 NATURE 311, 311–12 (2004) (discussing how juggling 
training induces neuroplasticity via grey matter (neuronal) and white matter (connectivity) 
changes in the brain); Gerd Kempermann, The Pessimist’s and Optimist’s Views of Adult 
Neurogenesis, 145 CELL 1009, 1009 (2011) (discussing how neuroplasticity is manifest 
through the growth of new neurons).
84 See Draganski et al., supra note 83, at 311.
85 Id. at 311–12 (discussing how neuroplasticity occurred when subjects learned a new 
skill (in this case, juggling)).
86 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Parsons et al., The Brain Basis of Piano Performance, 43 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 199, 199–200 (2005) (discussing the neural responses accompanying 
various musical exercises).
87 Nandini Mundkur, Neuroplasticity in Children, 72 INDIAN J. PEDIATRICS 855, 856 
(2005) (noting that “plasticity of the brain is . . . maximal during the critical periods [that 
occur in youth]”); Ronald L. Simons & Eric T. Klopack, Invited Address: “The Times They 
Are A-Changin’” Gene Expression, Neuroplasticity, and Developmental Research, 44 J.
YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 573, 575–76 (2015) (discussing the empirical evidence supporting 
neuroplasticity in children). 
88 See Mundkur, supra note 87, at 855 (discussing the phenomenon of pruning).
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reaches early adulthood.89 After this time, the physical configuration of our 
brains becomes more stable.90
But neuroplasticity, though more attenuated, continues throughout our adult 
lives as we continue to learn and collect new experiences.91 Recent research has 
shown, for example, that adults can grow new neurons, something that was 
previously thought not to occur.92 And a striking example of neuroplasticity in 
adults is seen in those who bounce back from a serious brain injury, like a stroke, 
that kills brain tissue.93 The recovery is thought to occur through neural rewiring 
that allows healthy parts of the brain to take on new functions.94 If brain tissue 
originally responsible for moving the right arm is damaged, leading to partial 
paralysis, for example, the brain may rewire itself to allow another part of the 
brain to adopt this function and restore movement in the right arm.95 Though 
dramatic, this illustration underscores how the adult brain continues to change 
in response to individualized circumstances and experiences throughout a 
person’s life.
Again, though, less dramatic illustrations of neuroplasticity can be seen 
every day: every time we commit something to long-term memory, every time 
we learn a new skill.96 Every experience that changes us as individuals in a long-
lasting way also changes our brains, and is an example of neuroplasticity at 
work.97
                                                                                                                     
89 Id. at 856.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 856 (“Plasticity of the brain is maximal in [youth], but continues at a reduced 
rate throughout life.”).
92 See Draganski et al., supra note 83, at 311 (discussing how changes in grey matter 
(neurons) occur when adult subjects learn a new skill); Kempermann, supra note 83, at 1009 
(discussing the phenomenon of adult “neurogenesis” (birth of new neurons)).
93 E.g., Alan Sunderland & Anna Tuke, Neuroplasticity, Learning and Recovery After 
Stroke: A Critical Evaluation of Constraint-Induced Therapy, 15 NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL
REHABILITATION 81, 81–82 (2005) (discussing rehabilitation techniques that aid stroke 
recovery through the mechanism of neuroplasticity).
94 E.g., Shaheen Hamdy et al., Organization and Reorganization of Human Swallowing 
Motor Cortex: Implications for Recovery After Stroke, 99 CLINICAL SCI. 151, 151 (2000) 
(hypothesizing how areas of the brain may reorganize themselves after stroke to recover 
previous functionality). 
95 See id.; see also A. Turton et al., Contralateral and Ipsilateral EMG Responses to 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation During Recovery of Arm and Hand Function After 
Stroke, 101 ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY & CLINICAL NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 316, 316–17
(1996). 
96 See Draganski, supra note 83, at 311.
97 Mundkur, supra note 87, at 855 (“Neuroplasticity refers to structural and functional 
changes in the brain that are brought about by training and experience. The brain is the organ 
that is designed to change in response to experience.”).
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2. Malleable Rationality
Neuroplasticity has implications for models of human behavior and 
decision-making. Neuroscientists have long understood that decision-making 
and behavior is orchestrated and dictated to a large extent by our brains.98 And 
we know that through the workings of neuroplasticity our experiences—
especially those we encounter early in life—alter our brains in ways relevant to 
future decision-making.99 It follows, then, that our experiences help determine 
how, at a later time, our brains process information in the decision-making 
context. And though all experiences are potential sources of neuroplasticity,100
independent of their source, my focus here is on the experiences we are 
subjected to collectively, as a result of the laws and policies adopted by our 
governments.
Person A, with a given set of experiences resulting from a given set of 
government policies, will have a different brain from a genetically identical 
person B with a dissimilar set of experiences resulting from a different set of 
policies. Further, these differences will affect their respective decision-making 
capacities. Though both A and B are boundedly rational in the general sense, 
they may each be more or less boundedly rational in specific ways—ways that 
have been dictated by their previous experience, and that have real implications 
for how they will approach particular decisions in the future. Each person’s
brain has been molded in a specific way over time as a result of the policies she 
has lived with. Unlike neoclassical and bounded rationality models, this reflects 
a malleable and dependent view of rationality—rationality that changes over 
time in particular, identifiable, long-lasting ways in response to policy. 
The concept of a malleable and dependent rationality departs from both 
neoclassical and bounded rationality theories in its conception of how 
decision-making changes over time.101 To be sure, each of these theories has 
previously recognized that the decision a person makes at time A may differ 
from the decision he makes at time B for various reasons. Neoclassical rational 
choice theory, for instance, acknowledges that individuals have preferences, and 
                                                                                                                     
98 See CHARLES STANGOR, BEGINNING PSYCHOLOGY 114–33 (2012) (ebook)
(discussing the idea that human brains control thoughts, feelings, and behavior).
99 See, e.g., Eduardo Dias-Ferreira et al., Chronic Stress Causes Frontostriatal 
Reorganization and Affects Decision-Making, 325 SCIENCE 621, 621 (2009) (discussing how 
brain neuroplasticity caused by stressful life experiences influences later decision-making). 
100 See, e.g., Mundkur, supra note 87, at 856–57 (listing visual, audio, and lingual 
experiences as examples).
101 The concept of malleable rationality should also be distinguished from the related 
concept of “time-shifted rationality,” introduced by Owen Jones. The theory of time-shifted 
rationality uses evolutionary biology to explain why observed behaviors that seem irrational 
in a modern environment are in fact historically rational in the sense that they conferred an 
evolutionary advantage. Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s
Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1141, 1144–
45, 1169–87 (2001) (defining time-shifted reality and providing examples); Jones, supra
note 7, at 15–17.
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that these preferences may change over time.102 Thus, an individual who makes 
a decision at time A under rational choice theory will do so in a way that 
maximizes his utility function according to his preferences at time A. If his 
preferences have changed at time B, the decision itself may change because his 
utility function will look different. But one thing that remains constant is the 
way this person makes his decision. Under rational choice theory, he will always 
make the decision that maximizes his personal utility.103
Similarly with bounded rationality theory. The theory recognizes that 
people’s decisions are influenced not only by their preferences at the time of 
decision-making, but also by irrelevant features of the choice, like the way in 
which a decision is framed, or the decision-maker’s reference point at the time 
of decision.104 Just like preferences, these irrelevant features might not (and in 
fact likely will not) be constant from one point in time to the next. Thus, we 
might expect a person’s actual choice to differ between time A and time B
depending on the quantity and quality of irrelevant features present.105 What 
remains constant under bounded rationality theory, however, is the actor’s basic 
decision-making capacity.106 He is boundedly rational in a static sense, and will 
always be influenced by irrelevant features of the choice (whichever happen to 
be present at the time) in the way bounded rationality theory identifies.107
In contrast, what malleable rationality proposes is not just that an actor may 
select a different option at time B than he would have at time A, either because 
his preferences or features of the choice have changed. Instead, malleable
                                                                                                                     
102 See, e.g., Andreou, supra note 11 (describing the “dynamic choice problem” wherein 
people are imperfect at predicting their future preferences).
103 See Posner, supra note 35, at 431 (describing the utility calculation).
104 See, e.g., Goldin, supra note 9, at 231 (characterizing the insights of behavioral law 
and economics as actors making decisions “based on . . . preference-irrelevant feature[s] of 
the decision”).
105 See, e.g., Tor, supra note 67, at 306–14 (describing how the same decision-maker 
may employ different decision-making strategies based on the content of the decision-
making domain and the context in which the decision occurs). Boundedly rational actors 
may also explicitly rely on their previous experiences when making a decision. This 
recognition has given rise to the “decisions from experience” literature in bounded 
rationality. See Ralph Hertwig et al., Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare 
Events in Risky Choice, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 534, 535–37 (2004) (explaining decisions from 
experience theory and exploring how decisions made from experience may lead to the
underweighting of rare events). But this literature does not propose, as I do here, that 
decision-makers are fundamentally changed on a physiological level by their previous 
experiences. 
106 Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1477.
107 This is not to say, however, that the deviations from strict rationality behavioral law 
and economics identifies do not exhibit any variability. Avishalom Tor, for example, points 
out that bounded rationality exhibits heterogeneity that can depend on the circumstances 
surrounding the choice. Avishalom Tor, Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 573, 612–14 (2014). Again, though, this is somewhat different from the point I am 
making: that rationality can be molded by earlier policy choices in long-lasting and 
predictable ways. 
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rationality recognizes that the decision-maker himself has changed between 
these two points in time. And not simply in a fleeting way, such as in how he 
happens to be feeling in the particular moment, but more permanently, in a way 
that is driven by his experiences with earlier policies and is reflected in his very 
capacity for rational decision-making.108 This more permanent physiological 
change occurs via the workings of neuroplasticity.109 Rather than merely being 
swayed in his decision-making by the preferences of the moment or the features 
of the choice presented, what malleable rationality recognizes is that an actor is 
inherently more or less rational (or exhibits certain biases to a greater or lesser 
degree) in certain situations because of previous experiences that 
physiologically changed him. 
Let’s return to John to illustrate the principle. In a pure rational actor 
scenario, John balances the utility he expects to gain from his crime against the 
disutility he expects to experience from punishment, weighted by the probability 
of being punished.110 If his expected utility for committing the crime is greater 
than his expected disutility arising from punishment, John will commit the 
crime.111 This model reflects a static conception of rationality—John has certain 
preferences at the time he makes his decision, and he uses these preferences to 
construct his utility function.112 These preferences might change with time, but 
John always makes his decision in the same way—by rationally maximizing 
utility.113
In the classic bounded rationality scenario, figuring in John’s present bias, 
ignoring other relevant biases and heuristics, and employing an expected utility 
model, John’s expected disutility will be lower than in the pure rational actor 
model because John is underestimating the discomfort he will experience in the 
future.114 John’s cost-benefit analysis will be modified accordingly. Note that 
although time figures into the bounded rationality equation through future 
discounting, this is still, like the pure rational actor scenario, a static model. We 
take John as a generalized boundedly rational person without asking how his 
previous experiences may have modified his decision-making capacity in 
relevant ways. At whatever time John makes his decision, we give him the same 
discount function attributable to his present bias. He is boundedly rational in a 
static way. Of course, features or circumstances present at one time or another 
may trigger certain additional biases or heuristics that will affect John’s choice. 
                                                                                                                     
108 Cf. Kevin N. Ochsner & James J. Gross, The Cognitive Control of Emotion, 9 TRENDS 
COGNITIVE SCI. 242, 243 (2005) (distinguishing between short-term behavioral emotional 
regulation and cognitive regulation that is the product of long-term physiological changes to 
the brain). 
109 See supra Part III.A.1.
110 See Posner, supra note 35, at 431; Dolinko, supra note 36, at 1656 n.145.
111 See Posner, supra note 35, at 431. 
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 See, e.g., Robinson & Darley, supra note 50, at 179–81; Spelman, supra note 50, at 
109.
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But on a fundamental, physiological level, John remains unchanged, and 
whatever features are or are not present, John’s decision-making will always be 
affected in the same way by these features.
Enter my proposition—that rationality is in fact malleable and depends on 
previous policy choices. According to this model, policy decisions we make at 
time A—before John is confronted with the choice to commit a crime—will 
change John in long-lasting ways that bear on his decision-making capacity at 
time B—our moment of interest. 
To this end, imagine that neuroscience and psychology experiments have 
shown that the brains of people raised in poverty develop in such a way as to 
make them more susceptible to emotional effects and less able to control 
impulsive behaviors than the average person—a hypothetical assertion that, as 
I later explain, turns out to be true.115 Now imagine that John was raised in 
poverty in part because the city in which he was raised decided at time A—
shortly before John was born—to divert funding from anti-poverty programs to 
law enforcement programs. This earlier policy choice will affect John’s
decision-making capacity at time B, when he is confronted with the choice to 
commit a crime. Emotional effects and imperfect impulse control are a standard 
part of the bounded rationality account—we expect even the generalized, 
hypothetical boundedly rational person to exhibit these effects to some 
degree.116 But because of John’s earlier policy-driven experience with poverty, 
an experience that has changed him physiologically in a “sticky” long-lasting 
way, he will exhibit emotional effects and impaired impulse control to a degree 
he would otherwise not have exhibited. John himself has changed, and we can 
predict the direction of that change (from better to worse impulse control) based 
on neuroscience and psychology experiments showing how poverty affects the 
brain.117 Because of the change, John will be more subject to impulse effects 
than the hypothetical person (even a boundedly rational person) considered in a 
temporal vacuum.118 This has implications for how John will make his choice. 
Specifically, in this case, he will be more likely to succumb to emotional 
impulse, and less likely to be deterred by the prospect of punishment than we 
might otherwise predict. If we want to predict how John will respond to a given 
set of criminal deterrents, we need to understand how the earlier policy choice 
affected his rationality. 
Just as Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler have argued that bounded rationality 
should be used as a basis for more realistic models of human behavior and 
decision-making,119 I argue here that the malleable nature of rationality, as 
illustrated with our hypothetical criminal John, should also be taken into account 
when constructing these models.
                                                                                                                     
115 Infra Part III.B.1.a.
116 See McChesney, supra note 47, at 49–50. 
117 See infra Part III.B.1.a.
118 See infra Part III.B.1.a.
119 Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1478.
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And despite the potential complexity, we can. Malleable rationality is a 
relevant and workable improvement over existing models of decision-making 
because we can use empirical work to predict the types of policies that tend to 
modify the brain and change decision-making capacity in specific ways. We 
know from neuroscience and psychology research, for instance, that poverty 
leads to brain changes that in turn lead to increased impulse effects.120 This is 
why it is possible to incorporate it into decision-making models. If we know that 
most of the target population for our criminal deterrence efforts was raised in 
poverty, we can account for the corresponding heightened impulse effects when 
predicting how that population will respond to particular deterrence efforts.121
In this way, malleable rationality continues in the tradition of bounded 
rationality. It is possible to incorporate bounded rationality into models of 
behavior because behavioral experiments show us how people depart from 
rationality in predictable ways.122 Similarly here, it is possible to incorporate 
malleable rationality into models of behavior because behavioral experiments 
show us how particular policies can affect decision-making capacity over 
time.123 Malleable rationality adds a layer of complexity and accuracy to 
bounded rationality by recognizing that decision-making capacity can be 
influenced by earlier laws and policies in specific, predictable, and long-lasting 
ways. 
B. Examples and Applications
Recognizing the phenomenon of malleable rationality can help us better 
predict how individuals will react to specific laws and policies. We can then use
these insights to direct behaviors in welfare-enhancing ways and avoid 
unintended consequences. 
Here, I work from examples in criminal law and advertising law to illustrate 
the point. As suggested by the criminal law-based hypotheticals I include 
throughout the Article, the concept of malleable rationality is particularly 
relevant to this area. Criminal law is concerned, in part, with deterring certain 
behaviors;124 to design it optimally, therefore, we need to understand as 
accurately as possible how people will respond in real-life situations to various 
deterrents, and what factors might keep them from responding as anticipated. 
The examples I present, highlighting the effects of poverty and exposure to 
violent media on the brain, reveal how policies seemingly unrelated to criminal 
deterrence in fact have profound implications for this area of law.
                                                                                                                     
120 Infra Part III.B.1.a. 
121 Infra Part III.B.1.a.iii.
122 See Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1474.
123 See infra Part III.B for examples. 
124 E.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation 
of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 950–51 (2003) 
(discussing, and then questioning, the preeminent role deterrence plays in the criminal law).
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Similarly, advertising law is ideal for elucidating the malleable nature of 
rationality. Advertising law deals with the regulation of information, and the 
idea that information access at time A can shape our capacity for processing 
information at time B is intuitive. The illustration I present here demonstrates 
how a policy enacted with the value of consumer autonomy in mind can, through 
the workings of malleable rationality, unintentionally undermine that very value 
at a future point in time. It thus presents an additional striking example of how 
we ignore the malleable nature of rationality at our own peril.
1. Criminal Law
The story of U.S. criminal law is a long and fascinating one. Originally 
imported as common law from Britain,125 today criminal law is mostly a 
creature of state statutes.126 And though there is wide public and scholarly 
consensus that the choice to have a criminal law is the correct one, there is
debate about the precise purposes a criminal justice system should serve127—
and relatedly, whether our current system in fact serves those purposes.128
Some scholars take a purely deontological, retributivist stance on this 
question.129 Under this view, the criminal law exists to exact punishment on
citizens whose actions society deems to be morally blameworthy in some 
way.130 But others assert that in addition to retributivist considerations, the 
criminal law should also serve utilitarian goals.131 There is some debate about 
what these goals should be—whether, for example, the criminal law should 
                                                                                                                     
125 Stephen Shute, With and Without Constitutional Restraints: A Comparison Between 
the Criminal Law of England and America, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 329, 329–30 (1998).
126 Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Response, What Is Criminal Law About?, 114 
MICH. L. REV. 1173, 1180 (2016). 
127 See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Why Criminal Law: A Question of Content?, 2 CRIM. L. &
PHIL. 99, 99 (2008); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND 
JUSTICE 1282, 1284–92 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002) (describing the purposes of 
punishment); Mary Graw Leary, The Third Dimension of Victimization, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 139, 139, 141–43 (2015) (discussing “several complementary purposes” of criminal law).
128 See, e.g., Rose M. Brewer & Nancy A. Heitzeg, The Racialization of Crime and 
Punishment: Criminal Justice, Color-Blind Racism, and the Political Economy of the Prison 
Industrial Complex, 51 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 625, 628–30 (2008) (critiquing the criminal 
justice system through the lens of critical race theory); Husak, supra note 127, at 99–100 
(questioning how the criminal justice system can succeed in the absence of a clear purpose); 
Leary, supra note 127, at 139–40 (critiquing the criminal justice system as outdated due to 
technological advances).
129 E.g., Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and 
Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 19–26 (2005) (discussing theories of retribution in the criminal law).
130 Id.
131 See, e.g., Benjamin L. Apt, Do We Know How To Punish?, 19 NEW CRIM. L. REV.
437, 453–55 (2016) (discussing the leading utilitarian theories of criminal punishment).
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deter wrongdoing,132 incapacitate those who are a danger to society,133
rehabilitate those who have engaged in antisocial behavior,134 or some 
combination of all of these.135 For purposes of this Article, I focus on the 
popular stance that the criminal law should serve a deterrent function.136 At its 
most basic, the deterrence theory posits that the criminal law, by punishing 
certain harmful behaviors, will dissuade people who are contemplating these 
behaviors from engaging in them.137
The examples I present here in the criminal law space suggest that the 
phenomenon of malleable rationality has surprising consequences for the 
deterrence theory of criminal law. In particular, two seemingly unrelated 
policies—one related to poverty and one to media exposure—each change our 
understanding of how populations exposed to these policies will respond in a 
criminal deterrence scenario.
a. Criminal Law and Poverty
As alluded to earlier through our hypothetical criminal John, a group of 
studies exploring the effects of poverty on the brain illustrates how earlier-
enacted and seemingly unrelated policies can influence rationality in ways that 
bear on criminal decision-making. Scholars have long been aware of the 
connection between poverty and risk for criminal behavior,138 but recent 
research suggests that this association may be partly attributable to changes in 
decision-making capacity, grounded in physiological changes in the brain, that 
                                                                                                                     
132 Id. at 449–53. 
133 Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through Predictions of Recidivism,
96 HARV. L. REV. 511, 512 (1982) (proposing a selective incapacitation approach wherein 
those with higher probabilities of recidivism are incarcerated longer for their crimes).
134 Apt, supra note 131, at 458–62. 
135 Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 325 (2011) (“These four considerations—
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—are the four purposes of 
sentencing generally, and a court must fashion a sentence ‘to achieve the[se] purposes . . . to 
the extent they are applicable’ in a given case.” (alteration in original)).
136 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 124, at 950–51 (describing deterrence as a 
“centerpiece of criminal law reform”); see also Fellmeth, supra note 129, at 26–31 
(describing theories of and justifications for deterrence).
137 Apt, supra note 131, at 449–53. 
138 See Nathalie E. Holz et al., The Long-Term Impact of Early Life Poverty on 
Orbitofrontal Cortex Volume in Adulthood: Results from a Prospective Study over 25 Years,
40 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 996, 996 (2015) (“Consistent evidence indicates that 
poverty is a main determinant [of certain types] of increased . . . aggressive, deceptive, and 
destructive behaviors toward peers and adults.”); Ching-Chi Hsieh & M.D. Pugh, Poverty, 
Income Inequality, and Violent Crime: A Meta-Analysis of Recent Aggregate Data Studies,
18 CRIM. JUST. REV. 182 (1993) (conducting a meta-analysis of previous studies and finding 
positive correlations between poverty and violent crime, and between income inequality and 
violent crime); Jack Watson, Poverty and Crime, LAWNOW, Feb.–Mar. 2000, at 47 (“Poverty 
is the mother of crime.” (quoting Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, 121–180 C.E.)).
2018] MALLEABLE RATIONALITY 39
poverty wreaks on affected individuals.139 This insight leads to behavioral 
predictions that depart from both neoclassical and bounded rationality models. 
i. Neoclassical Rationality
According to the neoclassical rationality model of criminal deterrence, a 
rational actor, before committing to any criminal action, will weigh the costs 
and benefits of that action and choose the route that promises the greatest 
expected utility.140 In order to deter crime under a neoclassical rationality 
model, then, the task is to ensure that the costs of criminal behavior, generally 
speaking, outweigh the benefits. Richard Posner sums it up nicely in reviewing 
Bentham’s contribution to the economic foundations of criminal law:
[A] person commits a crime only if the pleasure he anticipates from the crime 
exceeds the anticipated pain, or in other words only if the expected benefit 
exceeds the expected cost; to deter crime, therefore, the punishment must 
impose sufficient pain that, when added to any other pain anticipated by the 
criminal, it will exceed the pleasure that he anticipates from the crime . . . .141
From this basic premise follow a number of additional conclusions about 
how the criminal law should be structured. If a potential criminal has a choice 
among several crimes, for instance, punishments should be structured so that the 
criminal’s cost-benefit analysis steers him towards the least serious crime.142
And, importantly, if the likelihood of being caught goes down for whatever 
reason, the severity of punishments should go up to keep the expected cost to 
the criminal at optimal deterrence levels.143
These neoclassical law and economic notions of punishment and deterrence 
have greatly influenced the criminal law, both in Britain and in the United 
States.144 And neoclassical law and economics continues to exert its influence 
on thinking about this body of law today—deterrence theories in particular.145
As time has gone on, neoclassical law and economics thinking about criminal 
law has evolved to embrace more sophisticated economic concepts—the idea of 
                                                                                                                     
139 See infra Part III.B.1.a.iii. 
140 Robinson & Darley, supra note 50, at 201; Spelman, supra note 50, at 121. 
141 Posner, supra note 35, at 431. 
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 431–32. 
145 See, e.g., William L. Barnes, Jr., Note, Revenge on Utilitarianism: Renouncing a
Comprehensive Economic Theory of Crime and Punishment, 74 IND. L.J. 627, 631 (1999) 
(“Of any theory of crime and punishment, that of general deterrence has been the most 
embraced by law and economics scholars.”). See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s
Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2389–419 (1997) (engaging in an economic analysis of 
criminal deterrence).
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preference shaping,146 for instance, or the notion that criminal law discourages 
inefficient market bypassing.147 But the basic idea that punishment inflicts 
disutility on potential criminals, and thereby discourages them from committing 
crimes, remains.148
ii. Bounded Rationality
A number of scholars have discussed the implications of bounded rationality 
for criminal deterrence models. Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, for example, point 
out that due to the availability heuristic—the tendency for people to judge highly 
visible events as more probable, regardless of their actual probability—we can 
increase the perceived expected costs of a crime (and thus achieve greater 
deterrence) without actually raising the probability of punishment.149 This could 
be achieved by making particular instances of punishment more visible: 
flagging parking violations with large, brightly-colored signs, for example,150
or increasing the visibility and presence of police officers.151
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler also posit that due to future discounting—the 
tendency for people to discount future consequences and give undue weight to 
present rewards—perceived probability of detection may play a greater role in 
a criminal’s expected cost calculation than severity of punishment, since the 
perceived cost of additional future years in prison will be heavily discounted.152
This insight leads them to argue that relatively short but certain punishments 
may be more effective deterrents than relatively long punishments administered 
more infrequently.153 Their argument has been backed up by empirical studies 
of criminal deterrence showing that sure punishment deters better than severe 
punishment.154
                                                                                                                     
146 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a 
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (1990) (arguing that criminal law helps 
shape preferences in socially beneficial ways).
147 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1193, 1195 (1985) (arguing that the goal of the criminal law is to discourage inefficient 
market bypassing).
148 See Barnes, supra note 145, at 630–32. 
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153 Id. at 1538–40. 
154 See Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, in 42 CRIME & JUSTICE 
IN AMERICA, 1975–2025, at 199, 199 (Michael Tonry ed., 2013) (“The evidence in support 
of the deterrent effect of the certainty of punishment is far more consistent than that for the 
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consequence, is the more effective deterrent.”).
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Matthew Haist additionally argues that motivated reasoning,155 optimism 
bias,156 and the control illusion157 have implications for criminal deterrence.158
According to Haist, potential criminals will be overly optimistic about their 
chances of getting away with the crime or being punished less severely if they 
are apprehended because of optimism bias, motivated reasoning about how the 
fact finder will evaluate their moral culpability, and the illusion that they can 
somehow influence the fact finder to be lenient in their particular situation.159
Rather than propose solutions to these behavioral glitches in the neoclassical 
general deterrence model, Haist takes the position that they will inevitably lead 
to under-deterrence and are thus fatal to the theory.160
Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko has observed that in accordance with 
bounded rationality principles, people are “ambiguity averse”: they tend to 
avoid choice scenarios that make it difficult to assess risk.161 She thus suggests 
that deterrence efforts be structured so that potential criminals have a hard time 
estimating their risk of being caught.162 The hope, of course, is that faced with 
this ambiguity, potential criminals will simply opt out of committing crimes 
altogether.163 Kantorowicz-Reznichenko makes some practical suggestions in 
this vein, including the use of random police patrols and the enhanced (and 
publicized) use of undercover officers.164
Finally, it has been observed that bounded willpower, a bounded rationality 
concept related to impulse effects,165 may hinder people from responding to 
                                                                                                                     
155 Matthew Haist, Comment, Deterrence in a Sea of “Just Deserts”: Are Utilitarian 
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165 Although bounded willpower could technically be classified differently from other 
aspects of bounded rationality because it focuses more on volitional, rather than purely 
cognitive, processes, Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler treat it as an aspect of the larger category of 
systematic bounds on conventional economic choice models. Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 
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criminal deterrents as expected.166 The idea is that actors can, in some cases, be 
swayed by an impulse to satisfy an immediate need that threatens or overwhelms 
their ability to make choices that are in their long-term best interest.167
iii. Malleable Rationality
The implications of malleable rationality for criminal deterrence are 
fundamentally different from those of bounded rationality. The insight is not 
simply that individuals are boundedly rational and that this will have 
implications for neoclassical criminal deterrence models in the ways identified 
by scholars working in this vein. Instead, the phenomenon of malleable
rationality suggests that an earlier and seemingly unrelated policy decision can 
affect governed individuals in ways that initiate long-lasting changes in these 
individuals’ capacity to make choices about criminal behavior. We must 
understand these changes if we hope to accurately predict how people will 
approach the decision to commit a crime and calibrate their incentives 
appropriately.
Here, the relevant, unrelated policy is one of many possible policy choices 
that results in some subset of the population growing up in poverty. Myriad 
studies in the neuroscience and psychology literatures suggest that growing up 
in poverty changes brain and behavior in long-lasting ways relevant to criminal 
decision-making.168
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166 See DONALD RITCHIE, VICT. SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, DOES IMPRISONMENT 
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al., Socioeconomic Disparities in Neurocognitive Development in the First Two Years of 
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Children who grow up in poverty, for instance, show reduced cognitive 
performance as measured through various metrics like standard IQ tests and 
school achievement.169 More specifically, poor kindergarten-aged children have 
reduced language ability, working memory function, and cognitive control 
compared to children of higher socioeconomic status.170 These are long-lasting 
effects that impact a child throughout his life.171 Performance gaps observed 
between high- and low-socioeconomic-status children observed in early youth 
are exacerbated over time and are widest by the time these children reach 
adolescence.172
The long-lasting nature of these behavioral deficits is unsurprising given 
their link to differences in brain development between low-socioeconomic-
status children and those with more privileged upbringings.173 The tasks that 
poor children find difficult—cognitive control, language, and working 
memory—are handled to a large extent by brain areas known as the prefrontal 
and executive systems.174 These very brain areas have been shown to undergo 
impaired development in low-socioeconomic-status children.175 One study, for 
instance, found that young children from low-income families had lower 
volumes of so-called “gray matter,” or critical brain tissue, in prefrontal brain 
areas necessary for information processing and executive action than their 
higher-income counterparts.176 Another revealed that children growing up in 
homes with annual family incomes below 25,000 U.S. dollars had brains with 
as much as 6% lower surface area than children from homes with incomes above 
150,000 U.S. dollars.177 The differences in brain structure were greatest in 
prefrontal and executive brain areas and were correlated with scores on 
cognitive tests measuring reading and memory ability.178 At the lowest end of 
                                                                                                                     
Socioeconomic Disparities] (exploring the relationship between socioeconomic status and 
brain development); Kimberly G. Noble et al., Family Income, Parental Education and 
Brain Structure in Children and Adolescents, 18 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 773 (2015) 
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169 E.g., Farah et al., supra note 168, at 166?67; Hanson et al., supra note 168, at 2; 
Noble et al., Socioeconomic Disparities, supra note 168, at 535. 
170 See Farah et al., supra note 168, at 168. This particular study tried to rule out as many 
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substances. Id. at 169.
171 See Noble et al., Socioeconomic Disparities, supra note 168, at 535.
172 See id. at 536.
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174 See id. 
175 See, e.g., Farah et al., supra note 168, at 166; Hanson et al., supra note 168, at 2; 
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176 See Hanson et al., supra note 168, at 5.
177 See Noble et al., Family Income, supra note 168, at 776 & fig.2. 
178 See id. at 777. 
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the income scale, differences of a few thousand dollars were correlated with 
significant changes in brain structure and cognitive ability.179
The precise reasons for these strong associations between socioeconomic 
status, brain development, and cognitive performance are still being 
investigated. Causal suspects include stress,180 reduced environmental 
stimulation through vehicles like toys, books, and adult attention,181 nutritional 
differences,182 or differences in the prenatal environment.183 Whatever the 
underlying cause or causes, the results are clear and striking. 
But what are their implications for criminal deterrence models? The 
connection arises through the understanding that brain areas most affected by 
poverty—prefrontal and executive areas—are the very regions critical for 
impulse control and executive decision-making.184 In other words, these are the 
parts of the brain that help people overcome their emotional impulses and act in 
more thoughtful, rational ways.185 If these regions are impaired, we can expect 
that decision-makers in possession of these brains will be less able than the 
average person to control the emotional impulses that often lead to criminal 
behavior.186 In the language of bounded rationality, they will experience greater 
“impulse effects” in a decision-making context than we would otherwise 
expect.187
This is not mere conjecture. Studies show that impaired development in the 
prefrontal and executive brain regions affected by poverty harms people’s
ability to rein in impulses towards criminal behavior. One review of the 
scientific literature, for example, concluded that dysfunction in these brain areas 
leads to increased impulsive aggression and violent behaviors because affected 
individuals cannot properly regulate their emotions.188 And a study explicitly 
                                                                                                                     
179 See id. at 774, 777.
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examining the long-term effects of childhood poverty on brain development and 
antisocial behavior189 concluded that adults raised in poverty had lower frontal 
brain area volume and also exhibited increased symptoms of conduct 
disorder,190 a behavioral syndrome exhibiting itself through the expression of 
norm violations, violence, and otherwise antisocial behaviors.191 A striking case 
study of a boy with severe structural defects in prefrontal brain areas catalogued 
his behavioral problems as including “egocentricity, impulsivity, hyperactivity, 
lack of empathy, lack of respect for authority, impaired moral judgment, an 
inability to plan ahead, and poor frustration tolerance,” leading the researchers 
to conclude that this area “has a profound contribution to the development of 
human prosocial behavior.”192
The upshot is that people’s brains can be changed in long-lasting ways that 
affect their decision-making capacity in a particular legal context—here, 
criminal law—by preexisting policies that may or may not have an obvious 
connection to this area. To appropriately calibrate incentives in a given area like 
criminal law, we must understand how these preexisting policies have affected 
the rationality profiles of targeted citizens. In this case, due to poverty’s
influence on brain development, at-risk populations will be subject not just to 
impulse effects, as we expect of the generalized boundedly rational person.193
They will be subject also to systematically greater impulse effects and will be 
systematically less able to control these impulses and weigh the costs and 
benefits of criminal behaviors than the average boundedly rational actor.194
As I discuss in more detail in Part IV, this insight can help us better 
understand and describe behaviors among populations of interest. And it can 
also aid in crafting deterrence policies that actually work, because they are based 
on a more realistic vision of how and why people make the decision to commit 
a crime. One option is for policy makers interested in criminal deterrence to
address the underlying contributor to heightened impulse effects—poverty—
directly. A second option would be to account for these heightened impulse 
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effects in a different way—for example, by undertaking interventions in the 
target population known to counter poverty’s effects on rationality and 
executive function.195
My goal here, however, is not to argue that any particular intervention 
should be adopted. Instead, it’s to highlight what both neoclassical and bounded 
rationality models have to this point failed to appreciate: that the extent to which 
people display particular biases depends on earlier policy choices. Whatever we 
might choose to do in this particular scenario, it is our understanding of 
malleable rationality that helps us identify the underlying interaction in the first 
place. Once we have identified the effect and its underlying cause, we are in the 
best possible position to take corrective action.
b. Criminal Law and Violent Media
i. Neoclassical and Bounded Rationality
As explained above, neoclassical rationality approaches to criminal law 
focus on deterrence, and assume that potential criminals will be deterred in 
accordance with a rational analysis of the costs and benefits of committing a 
crime. And scholars who have approached criminal deterrence from a bounded 
rationality perspective point out that identified instances of bounded rationality, 
like the optimism bias and impulse effects, will cause people, in general, to 
deviate in their response to deterrents from what neoclassical rationality 
predicts.196 While some scholars argue that these deviations fatally undermine 
deterrence efforts, others assert that the insights can be harnessed so as to make 
attempts at criminal deterrence more effective.197
ii. Malleable Rationality
Again, the implications of malleable rationality for criminal deterrence go 
beyond what has previously been proposed by neoclassical and bounded 
rationality scholars. Because of malleable rationality, we don’t simply expect 
people to exhibit biases in their decision-making, as bounded rationality 
scholars have already posited. Instead, we expect that people will exhibit 
identified biases to a greater degree than what we would otherwise predict, or 
in some cases display new biases, because of previous policies that have 
modified their capacity for rational decision-making. As already discussed, 
policies that contribute to childhood poverty lead to long-lasting brain changes 
                                                                                                                     
195 See, e.g., Julie Markant et al., Selective Attention Neutralizes the Adverse Effects of 
Low Socioeconomic Status on Memory in 9-Month-Old Infants, 18 DEVELOPMENTAL 
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 26, 26 (2016) (testing a spatial cueing task in nine-month-old 
infants and finding that it neutralized the negative effects of low socioeconomic status on 
memory function).
196 See McChesney, supra note 47, at 49–50.
197 Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1478.
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that can influence how affected actors approach the decision to commit a 
crime.198 Here, I explore how policies related to violent media exposure can also 
affect rationality in ways that bear on criminal decision-making. 
A number of studies have explored how exposure to certain types of media 
can change people’s brains in ways that could potentially affect their weighing 
of the costs and benefits of criminal conduct. There is robust consensus, for 
example, that exposure to violent media desensitizes people to violence and 
increases aggressive and antisocial behaviors.199 People so exposed are less 
likely to show concern over subsequent real-life violence,200 are more prone to 
feelings of anger and hostility,201 are more likely to indulge in aggressive 
thoughts and behaviors,202 and are less likely to engage in prosocial and helping 
behaviors.203
While this is true for both children and adults,204 when the exposure is 
frequent enough and occurs at a young enough age, the effects can be 
particularly long-lasting and difficult to overcome.205 Though exposure to 
violent images has a larger short-term influence on adults, triggering previously 
learned attitudes or “behavioral scripts,” and leading to increased aggression in 
                                                                                                                     
198 See supra Part III.B.1.a.iii.
199 See references cited infra notes 200–203.
200 Brad J. Bushman & Craig A. Anderson, Research Report, Comfortably Numb: 
Desensitizing Effects of Violent Media on Helping Others, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 273, 273 (2009).
201 Craig A. Anderson & Brad J. Bushman, Effects of Violent Video Games on 
Aggressive Behavior, Aggressive Cognition, Aggressive Affect, Physiological Arousal, and 
Prosocial Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Scientific Literature, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI.
353, 353 (2001); Craig A. Anderson et al., Exposure to Violent Media: The Effects of Songs 
with Violent Lyrics on Aggressive Thoughts and Feelings, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 960, 960 (2003); Kevin D. Browne & Catherine Hamilton-Giachritsis, Review,
The Influence of Violent Media on Children and Adolescents: A Public-Health Approach,
365 LANCET 702, 702–03 (2005); Brad J. Bushman & L. Rowell Huesmann, Short-Term and 
Long-Term Effects of Violent Media on Aggression in Children and Adults, 160 ARCHIVES 
PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 348, 350–51 (2006).
202 Anderson & Bushman, supra note 201, at 353; Anderson et al., supra note 201, at 
960; Browne & Hamilton-Giachritsis, supra note 201, at 702–03; Tobias Greitemeyer,
Effects of Prosocial Media on Social Behavior: When and Why Does Media Exposure Affect 
Helping and Aggression?, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 251, 251 (2011) 
(collecting references); Jamie M. Ostrov et al., Media Exposure, Aggression, and Prosocial 
Behavior During Early Childhood: A Longitudinal Study, 15 REV. SOC. DEV. 612, 612 
(2006); see also Paul Boxer et al., The Role of Violent Media Preference in Cumulative 
Developmental Risk for Violence and General Aggression, 38 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE
417, 417 (2009) (finding that a preference for violent media predicts future violence and 
general aggression). 
203 Anderson & Bushman, supra note 201, at 353; Bushman & Anderson, supra note 
200, at 273; Greitemeyer, supra note 202, at 251 (collecting references); Ostrov et al., supra 
note 202, at 612.
204 Bushman & Huesmann, supra note 201, at 348.
205 See id.; Ostrov et al., supra note 202, at 612; see also Boxer et al., supra note 202, at 
417 (finding that preference for violent media in young people helps predict future violence 
and general aggression).
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the short-term,206 the long-term effects of such exposure are much greater for 
children.207 When children are repeatedly208 exposed to violent media, the 
experience contributes to new learning and the formation of new behavioral 
scripts—scripts that privilege aggressive and angry thoughts and feelings over 
helpful behavior—that can last a lifetime.209 These scripts are encoded by 
physiological changes in the child’s malleable and developing brain, and, unless 
modified while the brain is still developing, will likely stay there.210
As with the research on poverty, the findings about the impacts of violent 
media on behavior have been linked to activity in specific areas of the brain 
important for self-control and executive functioning. One study, for instance, 
found that those repeatedly exposed to violent media showed decreased activity 
in brain regions associated with the ability to control a range of emotional 
impulses, including aggressive tendencies.211 Another determined that this 
exposure decreased activity in another brain region involved in executive 
control and emotion regulation.212 Violent media exposure also leads to 
increased activity in brain regions necessary for making and carrying out 
aggressive plans.213
The neuroscientific evidence that violent media exposure leads to long-term 
changes in the brain is less robust than the literature linking poverty to lasting 
brain changes. But the consensus that violent media has long-term impacts on 
aggressive behaviors,214 along with the traditional neuroscientific 
                                                                                                                     
206 Bushman & Huesmann, supra note 201, at 349–51.
207 Id. at 348.
208 Repetition is an important precursor to learning and the physiological changes that 
mediate this learning. See id.
209 Id. at 349–50. 
210 See id. at 349 (speaking to the “encoding” of specific behaviors); John P. Murray, 
Media Violence: The Effects Are Both Real and Strong, 51 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 1212, 1212 
(2008) (“The changes in aggression are both short term and long term, and these changes 
may be mediated by neurological changes in the young viewer.”). See generally Justin W. 
Collins, The Neuroscience of Learning, 39 J. NEUROSCIENCE NURSING 305 (2007) 
(reviewing the scientific literature explaining the neurophysiological basis of learning). This 
is not to say that adult brains exhibit no plasticity at all (or, in other words, that adults are 
incapable of behavioral change). But it is much more difficult for adults to change behavioral 
patterns and schemas learned as youth, precisely because their brains are less malleable than 
they were as children. See supra Part III.A.1.
211 Christopher R. Kelly et al., Repeated Exposure to Media Violence is Associated with 
Diminished Response in an Inhibitory Frontolimbic Network, Article in 12 PLOS One, PLOS
1 (2007), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0001268 [https://perma.
cc/7EGC-6TZC].
212 Nicholas L. Carnagey et al., Media Violence and Social Neuroscience: New 
Questions and New Opportunities, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 178, 180 (2007).
213 Id. at 178–80.
214 See, e.g., Murray, supra note 210, at 1212.
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understanding that behavior is the output of brain function,215 has led many 
neuroscientists to hypothesize that the lasting behavioral changes are mirrored 
by durable changes in relevant brain regions,216 changes we see in response to 
violent media exposure in the short term.217
These findings have implications for criminal deterrence models. The 
evidence suggests that repeated exposure to violent media results in both long-
and short-term increases in violent and aggressive behavior, and that at least the 
short-term effects can be correlated with changes in brain activity in regions 
associated with emotional control.218 Though a direct link between violent 
media exposure and criminal behavior has not been established,219 what is clear 
is that the brains of people exposed to such media are changed in ways that bear 
on their ability to make a rational choice about criminal behavior.220 Because 
this exposure downregulates activity in areas of the brain responsible for 
controlling aggressive and emotional impulses, we can expect those so exposed 
to be less able than the average person to control the emotional impulses that 
often precede violent and criminal behavior.221 Similar to the effects of poverty 
on decision-making, those with repeated exposure to violent media will 
experience bounded rationality’s “impulse effects” to a greater extent than we 
would otherwise expect in a criminal decision-making context.222
This, again, underscores the fact that malleable rationality is a phenomenon 
that should be accounted for when describing the decision-making capabilities 
citizens display in any given policy situation. Here, it tells us that the decision-
making capacity of potential criminals will be modified in relevant ways by 
policies regulating the production and distribution of violent media. This insight 
will help us gain a more accurate understanding of how people approach the 
decision to commit a crime.
                                                                                                                     
215 See Collins, supra note 210, at 305–07 (describing the “neurophysiological basis of 
learning” as an interaction between neurons and observed activity that is committed to long-
term memory).
216 See, e.g., Bushman & Huesmann, supra note 201, at 349 (discussing how long-term 
behavioral changes in aggression are “encoded” in the brain); Murray, supra note 210, at 
1224–25.
217 Kelly et al., supra note 211, at 1, 4; see also Carnagey et al., supra note 212, at 180.
218 See Kelly et al., supra note 211, at 4.
219 Browne & Hamilton-Giachritsis, supra note 201, at 704, 708; see also Joanne 
Savage, Does Viewing Violent Media Really Cause Criminal Violence? A Methodological 
Review, 10 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 99, 125 (2004).
220 See, e.g., Bruce D. Bartholow et al., Chronic Violent Video Game Exposure and 
Desensitization to Violence: Behavioral and Event-Related Brain Potential Data, 42 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 532, 537 (2006).
221 See Boes et al., supra note 168, at 1 (concluding that their results are “consistent with 
the notion that” structural and functional measures of prefrontal brain areas predict individual 
tendencies for impulsivity and vulnerability to behaviors like substance abuse resulting from 
poor impulse control). 
222 See McChesney, supra note 47, at 49 (describing impulse effects in the bounded 
rationality context).
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Appreciating the underlying policies that modify criminal decision-making 
in a targeted population can also help us determine how to best deter crime. This 
might mean tackling these policies directly in the service of crime deterrence, 
for example, by enacting regulations that make it more difficult for young 
viewers in particular to access violent media. Or it might mean that we simply 
account for these effects in devising alternative solutions: if we live in a world 
where violent media exposure begins early and is frequent, we should recognize 
that people, in the general case, will be more prone to impulse effects than in a 
hypothetical baseline world. To deter crime appropriately we will therefore need 
to account for these effects through “debiasing”—the use of behavioral 
economic principles to counter socially undesirable biases223—or other creative 
approaches. But the primary takeaway is that malleable rationality profoundly 
affects our formation of effective policy. 
I reiterate here that my goal is not to advocate any particular policy 
intervention. Rather, it’s to elucidate how earlier policy decisions, through the 
workings of malleable rationality, can permanently change the extent to which 
people display particular biases. We need to appreciate this point before we can 
properly implement the insights of bounded rationality. 
2. Advertising Law
Advertising law—defined here as the two interrelated areas of Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) advertising regulation and trademark law—is guided 
by a single overarching value: facilitating consumer choice and autonomy.224
Here, I show that a policy enacted with this value in mind—specifically, an FTC 
policy limiting the regulation of advertising directed towards children—might, 
due to the unanticipated long-term effects of this policy on the decision-making 
capacity of its targets, actually undermine this value by interfering with the 
future ability of consumers to exercise choice and autonomy in a meaningful 
way. This not only has normative consequences, but also arguably undercuts the 
doctrinal and theoretical foundation of advertising law itself. The fact that this 
major consequence flows from one well-meaning policy decision that fails to 
consider malleable rationality underscores the importance of taking this 
phenomenon into account.
The FTC, as a consumer protection agency,225 has broad authority to 
prevent both “unfair” and “deceptive” acts and practices in the interstate 
marketplace.226 The agency takes its mission seriously and has interpreted its 
broad mandate to include the regulation of unfair, false, and misleading 
                                                                                                                     
223 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 57, at 199–203.
224 See infra notes 240, 262 and accompanying text.
225 Protecting Consumers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
media-resources/truth-advertising/protecting-consumers [https://perma.cc/G9K6-KR5M].
226 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
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advertising.227 It fulfills its mandate through a combination of rulemaking, 
enforcement actions, consumer education, and policy guidance.228 The FTC has 
exercised its authority in the past to regulate a range of advertising practices, 
including false environmental claims (so-called “greenwashing”),229 health and 
fitness claims,230 deceptive marketing of gift cards,231 and funeral service 
provider advertising.232
In contrast to the FTC’s regulation of advertising, trademark law is an 
intellectual property regime designed to serve various goals. A trademark is a 
                                                                                                                     
227 The Consumer and Federal Regulation of Advertising, 53 HARV. L. REV. 828, 834 
(1940); Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of 
Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 680–86 (1977). 
228 Michael Grynberg, More than IP: Trademark Among the Consumer Information 
Laws, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1429, 1438–39 (2014); Protecting Consumers, supra note 
225.
229 See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Sends Warning Letter About 
Green Certification Seals (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015
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Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Actions Against Kmart, Tender and 
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230 See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Marketers of Simple Pure Supplements 
Settle FTC Court Action (May 3, 2016) [hereinafter Health Press Release],
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settle-ftc-court-action [https://perma.cc/G7BA-3HWS]; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
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[https://perma.cc/KC3V-A93F].
231 See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Kmart Settles with FTC over Gift Card 
Sales Practices (Mar. 12, 2007) [hereinafter Gift Card Press Release], https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2007/03/kmart-settles-ftc-over-gift-card-sales-practices [https://
perma.cc/4X6U-UHL2]. 
232 The FTC promulgated the so-called “Funeral Rule” in 1984 to regulate advertising 
by funeral service providers. The Funeral Rule requires funeral service providers to provide 
a number of disclosures to consumers, including itemized pricing information. See FED.
TRADE COMM’N, COMPLYING WITH THE FUNERAL RULE 1 (Apr. 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0131-complying-with-funeral-rule_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2E43-TG45].
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signifier233 that designates the source of a good or service.234 Owners of 
trademarks acquire rights in their marks by using these marks in commerce to 
identify their products.235 Once acquired, these rights empower mark owners to 
prohibit uses of their marks (or similar marks) that might confuse consumers 
about a product’s source236 or dilute the uniqueness of the owners’ marks in 
consumers’ minds.237 Modern federal trademark law is administered under the 
Lanham Act.238
a. Neoclassical Rationality
Despite its broad authority, the FTC’s approach to advertising regulation 
has been self-constrained by an overarching guiding principle: preserving 
consumer choice and autonomy.239
The agency’s emphasis on consumer choice is consistent with a traditional 
law-and-economics-style faith in free markets and the ability of consumers to 
make rational consumption choices that maximize their own welfare.240 An 
extreme version of this philosophy would posit that advertising regulation is 
never warranted because the market will give advertisers adequate incentives to 
offer consumers relevant and truthful information about their products.241
Goods and services providers who do not provide these disclosures will
eventually be “outed” by their competitors and will fail in the marketplace if 
                                                                                                                     
233 A trademark is often a word or symbol, but under modern trademark jurisprudence 
trademark protection has been afforded to such signifiers as smells, see In re Clarke, 17 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1239, 1239 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (finding a signature scent on yarn to be 
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(2015).
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consumption decisions for their children); Pitofsky, supra note 227, at 663–64 (arguing that 
most advertising regulation occurs to correct market failures that prevent consumers from 
getting the information they need to make rational consumption choices). 
240 See Pitofsky, supra note 227, at 663–64. 
241 See id. at 663.
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they do not change their ways, passed over by perfectly rational consumers who 
now have appropriate information.242
Even the most devoted neoclassical law and economics scholars 
acknowledge that there can be market failures, however, and this is where a role 
for advertising regulation comes in under this theory.243 The market may not 
provide monopolistic or oligopolistic sellers with adequate disclosure 
incentives, for example.244 More generally, in some cases the expense of 
disclosure or the complexity of the relevant information might make it 
undesirable for otherwise motivated sellers to provide consumers with the data 
they need.245 In these cases, according to neoclassical law and economics 
theory, the government should step in to ensure that sellers provide consumers 
with adequate product information.246
According to this account, government intervention is warranted not 
because we think that consumers cannot or will not make welfare-maximizing 
choices. To the contrary, neoclassical law and economics theory presumes that 
once armed with truthful and adequate information, consumers will make the 
personal welfare-maximizing choice.247 The role of government intervention is 
simply to ensure that consumers do in fact receive this information. 
Consistent with the premise of the welfare-maximizing rational actor, much 
of the FTC’s consumer-protection activity centers on those situations where, for 
one reason or another, the market has failed to provide consumers with truthful 
or adequate information.248 Greenwashing, health and fitness claims, gift cards, 
funeral services: these are all examples of situations where the public was being 
given false, misleading, or inadequate information by advertisers.249
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249 See, e.g., Greenwashing Press Release, supra note 229 (detailing FTC enforcement 
efforts against targeted companies for making “deceptive and unsubstantiated 
biodegradability claims”); Health Press Release, supra note 230 (quoting Director of the 
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But beyond evidencing an economics-based faith in consumers’ ability to 
maximize their own welfare, scholars have pointed out that the FTC’s light-
handed approach also appears to be guided by a commitment to the values of 
autonomy and individualism that goes beyond economic rationales.250
According to this view, even in those cases where a consumer may be making 
the “incorrect” choice, from a welfare perspective, the FTC, as an agency, 
hesitates to constrain that choice out of deference to consumer autonomy.251
Evidence for this view comes from the history of the FTC’s unfairness 
standard. Under the FTC Act, the agency has been given authority by Congress 
to regulate not only misleading and deceptive advertising practices, but also 
“unfair” practices.252 In the late 1970s, the FTC attempted to exercise its broad 
jurisdiction by heavily regulating advertising directed at children, arguing that 
such advertising was often, due to the nature of its intended audience, inherently 
unfair.253 After intense congressional and public backlash, much of it grounded 
in autonomy concerns (the Washington Post, for example, faulted the agency 
for its attempt to become a “national nanny”),254 the FTC backed down.255 What 
followed was a fourteen-year congressionally-initiated hiatus on new unfairness 
regulations.256
Since that time, the FTC has resurrected its unfairness policy, regulating 
advertising practices that in some cases go beyond simple deception or lack of 
disclosure.257 But, mindful of the lessons learned in the late 1970s, it does so 
                                                                                                                     
goods they want”). As I will later explain, although the agency has at times tried, under its 
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256 Beales, supra note 253; see also Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 
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with an explicit focus on consumer autonomy.258 The three-part unfairness test 
currently in use focuses on consumer harm, but only harms that cannot be 
reasonably avoided by consumers.259 If a consumer can reasonably avoid a 
harm, but chooses not to do so, the FTC will “respect that choice.”260
Similar to the FTC, trademark scholars also embrace neoclassical law and 
economics rationales for trademark protection that privilege consumer 
autonomy. Currently, the most popular account of trademark law’s purpose is 
the search cost theory, which posits that trademarks reduce consumer search 
costs by making it easier for them to identify the products they want.261 By 
preventing advertisers from conveying confusing or misleading information 
about a product’s source, trademark law helps consumers express their true 
preferences in the marketplace.262 According to the theory, this also facilitates 
the market’s effective functioning by giving producers the incentive to invest in 
high-quality products that consumers, armed with the right information, will 
choose over inferior offerings.263
Like the FTC’s approach to advertising regulation, the consumer search cost 
account of trademark law is very much grounded in neoclassical law and 
economics theory and the concept of the rational actor consumer.264 Similar to 
the sentiment motivating FTC regulation, the search cost theory conceives of 
trademark law as a market intervention designed to ensure that rational actor 
consumers receive the information they need to make welfare-enhancing 
choices.265 Implicit in this goal is the assumption that consumers, due to their 
inherent rationality, will, when given the correct information, make the welfare-
enhancing choice.
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The popular law-and-economics-based search cost account of trademarks 
also implicitly reflects a concern for consumer autonomy.266 By allowing mark 
owners to prohibit uses of a mark that might prevent consumers from accurately 
expressing their preferences, the search cost account aims to facilitate the 
exercise of consumer autonomy.267 By allowing mark owners to prohibit only
those uses and no others, the search cost account seeks to preserve as much 
competition, and as much consumer choice, as possible.268
b. Bounded Rationality
Scholars in the behavioral law and economics movement have pointed out 
that consumers, like actors in a range of situations, are boundedly rather than 
perfectly rational, and that this will affect how they respond to advertising and 
make consumption choices.269 Jolls and Sunstein have argued that the FTC’s
approach to deceptive advertising is already, in some ways, consistent with 
bounded rationality principles.270 Specifically, they note that the FTC’s policy 
of restricting advertisements that highlight one or two product success stories is 
consistent with the behavioral finding that boundedly rational actors tend to 
overestimate their own chances of success based on such information.271 But 
they also propose that the FTC could go further to tailor their advertising 
regulation to behavioral principles.272 They argue, for example, that to counter 
consumers’ optimism bias, firms could be required to frame product 
                                                                                                                     
266 See Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 
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270 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 57, at 215–16. 
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comparisons in terms of the potential harms arising from their own products, as 
opposed to the potential benefits arising from alternative products.273
Importantly, Jolls and Sunstein argue that this debiasing approach (a method 
that seeks to correct for behavioral biases that lead to suboptimal decision-
making) is consistent with the FTC’s focus on autonomy, because it preserves 
consumer choice while attempting to correct for specific instances of bounded 
rationality.274
As with FTC advertising regulation, trademark scholars have noted that 
consumers, contrary to search cost theory’s assumptions, are not always 
perfectly rational.275 A particular challenge to the search cost account arises 
from the observation that advertising is not designed to be purely informational, 
as neoclassical law and economics scholars often assume.276 Instead, it is 
designed to persuade, to deliberately appeal to consumers’ irrational emotional 
responses.277 Under this view, advertising is not as much about facilitating 
consumers’ expression of preferences via information exchange as it is about
creating, and manipulating, consumer preferences.278
Trademark scholars have a range of opinions on the correct policy response 
to advertising’s deliberate appeal to irrationality. Graeme Austin argues that the 
distinction between consumers as rational processors of information and 
consumers as irrational beings subject to manipulation by advertisers is in some 
ways irrelevant because it tells us little about how trademark law should be 
structured.279 Mark McKenna expresses the view that persuasive advertising is 
a phenomenon that, while not necessarily desirable, must be tolerated due to the 
lack of practical alternatives.280 But he argues that consumers, due to 
paternalism concerns, should nevertheless be treated as autonomous agents,281
and proposes his own consumer decision account of trademark law, which 
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focuses primarily on prohibiting deceptive uses of trademarks.282 Taking a 
different approach, Irina Manta suggests that the persuasive function of 
advertising can be welfare enhancing because it facilitates emotional and 
hedonic benefits for consumers.283 While McKenna’s approach, if adopted, 
would lead to significant changes in modern trademark doctrine,284 Manta’s
proposal seeks instead to explain, and justify, trademark doctrine as it currently 
exists.285
c. Malleable Rationality
Scholars attuned to irrational and boundedly rational consumer behaviors 
have previously relied on bounded rationality to propose modifications to 
current FTC or trademark law.286 My target is more fundamental. I argue that 
the fact of malleable rationality has implications for the foundation of consumer 
autonomy on which advertising law rests. In this section, I explore empirical 
psychological and neuroscientific evidence suggesting that child-directed 
advertising has long-lasting effects on the rationality of those exposed to it, 
reducing their future ability to respond to advertising in rational and truly 
autonomous ways. Thus, though the FTC’s current policy of minimal regulation 
of child-directed advertising has grown in large part out of a desire to preserve 
consumer autonomy, the policy, due to the previously unaccounted-for 
phenomenon of malleable rationality, has the ironic consequence of 
undermining consumer autonomy in the long term.
Empirical evidence has been mounting about the effects of advertising on 
those exposed to it. The findings suggest this type of marketing has not only 
short-term, in-the-moment consequences for the preferences and decision-
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making processes of its targets,287 but also longer-term effects on consumers’
brains,288 and, ultimately, their capacity to make autonomous decisions.289
One illustration is the surprising effect that advertising can have on 
consumers’ long-term memories. Advertising viewed after a consumer has a 
particular experience with a product or service can actually change the 
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consumer’s memory of his experience with that product or service.290 We might 
remember a previously consumed brand of orange juice as being more tasty, for 
example, if we are later exposed to advertising highlighting the taste qualities 
of that brand.291 We might even remember shaking Bugs Bunny’s hand on our 
trip to Disneyland—a character not connected with or endorsed by Disney—if
later advertising suggests that this is in fact what happened.292 These modified
memories are long lasting, and can serve as the basis for future feelings of brand 
identification and purchasing decisions.293 More importantly for purposes of 
this Article, since we are, in some sense, a collection of memories and 
experiences, these findings demonstrate how advertising can change us, both 
psychologically and physiologically. The Jane Doe who has a memory of 
meeting Bugs Bunny at Disneyland is a slightly different person, with 
differently configured synaptic connections, than the Jane Doe who has no such 
memory. 
The false memory studies tell us that exposure to advertising in certain 
situations can change our brains in long-lasting ways, creating memories or 
biases that didn’t previously exist and that will influence future decision-
making, through the process of neuroplasticity.294 And when the target of that 
advertising is children, we expect those changes to occur even more readily, due 
to the relative plasticity of the child versus the adult brain.295 We may also 
expect these changes that occur during childhood to play an outsized role in 
decision-making processes that persist throughout a child’s life. Research shows 
that biases and associations acquired in childhood remain particularly accessible 
throughout adulthood and are uniquely resistant to being overridden by later
acquired concepts.296
A striking example of this in the advertising context involves children’s
exposure to ads for sugary cereal featuring the lovable character Tony the Tiger
(Tony). The exposure presumably changes the brains of these children such that 
they are hindered in their ability, as adults, to evaluate these products in an 
unbiased way.297 Grown-ups with childhood experience of Tony judge his 
cereal to be healthier than similarly-situated subjects whose first introduction to 
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Tony occurred in adulthood.298 The bias persists in subjects who have strong 
positive recollections of Tony even after behavioral debiasing techniques are 
deployed to help subjects make more rational judgments.299 And it persists even 
when the subjects themselves are motivated to correct these biases.300 Finally, 
these early-acquired biases lead Tony’s childhood friends to evaluate brand 
extensions more favorably than those subjects who first met Tony as adults.301
The irony here should be clear. Advertising regulation and trademark law 
both get their current theoretical underpinnings from an assumption that 
consumers are capable of autonomous decision-making.302 They also adopt a 
normative stance in favor of consumer autonomy—that it should be respected 
and facilitated whenever possible.303 In the 1970s, the FTC chose not to 
aggressively regulate child-directed marketing, specifically because it was seen 
as interfering with the value of consumer autonomy.304 But due to the previously
overlooked phenomenon of malleable rationality, the FTC’s autonomy-serving 
policy likely has precisely the opposite effect. Instead of promoting autonomy, 
the policy hinders consumers’ ability to act autonomously by allowing 
advertisers to instill long-lasting and hard-to-overcome biases that prevent truly 
independent decision-making. Consumers having wonderful childhood 
memories of Tony the Tiger show biased health evaluations of his cereal and 
related brand extensions, even when they really want to correct these biases.305
This does not sound like consumer autonomy.
Because we are failing to take account of the fact that rationality is a 
malleable characteristic, we find ourselves, in the context of advertising law, 
undermining the very values we are trying to promote. 
This insight is different from, and more far-reaching than, the insight that 
consumers are boundedly (rather than purely) rational. Specifically, the 
observations about bounded rationality made in the advertising context have 
mostly reflected a static conception of rationality—the fact that consumers tend 
to overestimate their own chances for success when presented with one or two 
success stories in ads, for example,306 or the fact that they tend to underestimate 
their chances of being harmed by a product.307 These insights are about the 
bounded rationality of a consumer at the moment he is exposed to an ad, and do 
not depend in any way on previous interactions this consumer may have had 
with laws and policies that might have influenced his rationality in relevant 
ways over time. My insight, on the other hand, is one about the malleable nature 
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of rationality, and illuminates how policy decisions over time can mold, 
sometimes in unexpected ways, the rationality profile consumers bring to the 
table. Here, a policy enacted at time A—a hands-off approach to regulating 
child-directed advertising—affects the degree of rationality consumers exhibit 
at time B—when they are exposed to advertising later in life.
Further, while the bounded rationality insight in the advertising context has 
led scholars to either condone308 or propose minor tweaks309 to the FTC’s
approach, a full understanding of malleable rationality requires that we take the 
long view. We should not just be asking whether the FTC’s approach helps the 
statically boundedly rational consumer make autonomous welfare-enhancing 
decisions in the moment of advertising exposure. Instead, we should think of 
the consumer as a malleable boundedly rational being. We should also be 
asking, then, how the FTC’s approach will affect rationality—and thus either 
contribute to or detract from a consumer’s ability to make autonomous welfare-
enhancing decisions—in the long term. 
In the example I raise here, a particular policy choice (not to 
comprehensively regulate child-directed advertising) will affect the decision-
making capacity of targeted consumers years later, and will do so in a way that 
diminishes their ability to make welfare-enhancing consumption decisions in 
the long term. At this later point, the debiasing techniques proposed by bounded 
rationality scholars will be limited in their ability to correct this problem—as 
found in the Tony the Tiger study, consumers whose exposure to childhood 
advertising led to particularly positive feelings for Tony were unable to correct 
their biased opinions of the products he was hawking, even when traditional 
debiasing techniques were used.310 Also crucial in light of the FTC’s expressed 
preference for consumer autonomy is the fact that adults exposed to this 
advertising as children were unable to correct the resulting biases even when 
they wanted to.311
All this suggests that in this particular case, something more than debiasing 
is needed to correct the departures from pure rationality that lead to suboptimal 
consumer decision-making. Here, the solution, on a general level, is obvious, 
though counterintuitive: if the FTC is serious about consumer welfare and 
autonomy, it should, in consideration of the long-term effects of advertising on 
young consumers, exert more control over at least certain categories of child-
directed advertising.312
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But my aim here is not to argue that child-directed advertising is a bad idea. 
Rather, it’s to highlight the crucial importance of taking the malleable nature of 
rationality into account when designing law and policy in any particular area. If 
we don’t, we may be enacting policies we think are accomplishing one thing but 
are in fact undermining the very goals we seek to achieve, along with the correct 
functioning of the laws put in place to attain them. In advertising and trademark 
law, the current laissez faire approach to emotionally appealing advertising—
particularly when it is directed at children—is driven by a desire to respect 
individual autonomy, yet it may be hurting consumers’ ability to make truly 
autonomous consumption decisions in the long term.313 As the proper 
functioning of trademark and advertising law as currently conceived depends on 
consumers being autonomous agents, this is something we should be taking into 
account when thinking about whether the current approach is the best one.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
As the examples in the last Part demonstrate, the previously overlooked 
malleable nature of rationality has practical implications for legal theories and 
doctrines in various areas. In this Part, I broaden the field of vision to explore 
how the theory of malleable rationality affects our understanding of decision-
making models and policy making more generally.
A. Positive Accounts of Decision-Making
Currently, the most realistic models of behavior incorporate the concept of 
bounded rationality, accounting for the role that various heuristics and biases 
play in an actor’s decision-making process.314 But, as explained, they generally 
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do not recognize how previous laws and policies may have altered an actor’s
decision-making capacity in long-lasting and relevant ways.315
The fact that an individual grew up in poverty due to a policy that prioritized 
law enforcement over social welfare programs, for example, gives us important 
additional information about how she will approach the decision to commit a 
crime.316 Though people, in general, are subject to impulse effects, this 
individual and others like her will exhibit systematically greater susceptibility 
to these effects than one would otherwise expect.317 This again, is due to the 
workings of malleable rationality—in particular here, the role that an 
impoverished upbringing has on brain development as it relates to impulse 
control.318 If we want to accurately predict how a member of this identified 
population will react in a criminal decision-making situation, our models should 
account for this. Similarly, one effect of policies that allow children to be 
targeted with advertising for unhealthy products featuring loveable cartoon 
characters is the long-lasting impaired capacity of this population to make truly 
autonomous and unbiased evaluations of these and related products throughout 
their lives, even after traditional debiasing techniques are deployed.319 This 
information is crucial if we wish to accurately predict how this population will 
respond in a consumer-choice context.
These are just two examples, and there are potentially many more. Indeed, 
the task of identifying the myriad ways in which previous, perhaps seemingly 
unrelated policies have molded rationality in ways relevant to a particular 
decision may seem like a daunting one. In this sense, malleable rationality 
suffers from the same critique leveled at bounded rationality—that it is “ad hoc”
because, rather than being a comprehensive theory, it depends on scholars 
identifying and incorporating salient empirical behavioral results.320
I am sympathetic to this critique, and I do not suggest that we need 
comprehensively catalog and analyze all relevant empirical results at once. 
Instead, I seek to begin a conversation here by offering a few examples of 
empirical results that, due to malleable rationality, have previously unidentified 
consequences for law and policy. Recognizing the importance of malleable
rationality opens a new field of research, and my position is that any 
acknowledgment of this phenomenon is a positive development that will add 
realism to current positive accounts of decision-making. My hope is that other 
scholars will join in the task of identifying additional relevant empirical results 
that have relevance to decision-making, through the workings of malleable
rationality, in their particular fields. 
                                                                                                                     
315 See supra Part III.A.2.
316 See supra Part III.B.1.a.
317 Holz et al., supra note 138, at 996–97.
318 See, e.g., Hanson et al., supra note 168, at 2.
319 See supra notes 299–303 and accompanying text (Tony the Tiger study). 
320 Mitchell, supra note 6, at 169–70; Posner, supra note 66, at 1552; Hubbard, supra
note 6, at 38–40.
2018] MALLEABLE RATIONALITY 65
B. Prescriptive and Normative Analyses
Predicting how an individual will respond to a specific law or policy through 
positive accounts of decision-making is arguably only the first step for a legal 
scholar. Ultimately, the goal should be to craft laws and policies in ways that 
make society better. This is what libertarian paternalism—a normative 
outgrowth of the behavioral law and economics approach—seeks to do, by 
taking advantage of behavioral insights to direct behavior in welfare-enhancing 
ways.321
The premise of libertarian paternalism is that institutions (both public and 
private) should endeavor to influence people’s behavior in ways that enhance 
welfare.322 According to its proponents, libertarian paternalistic goals can be 
achieved by harnessing insights about bounded rationality.323 One way to do 
this is to correct for identified instances of bounded rationality that lead to 
welfare-diminishing behavior. Jolls and Sunstein call this tack “debiasing 
through law.”324 They offer up the possibility of correcting for smokers’
tendency to underestimate their personal health risks by harnessing the 
availability heuristic, for instance.325 If we make illustrations of smoking harm 
more available, smokers may correct their inappropriately low perceptions of 
risk and take action accordingly.326
A related concept is that of the “nudge”—taking advantage of our 
knowledge of bounded rationality to nudge people towards welfare-enhancing 
behaviors.327 According to Sunstein and Thaler, one way we can nudge people 
is through default rules.328 As prospect theory predicts, people are influenced in 
their decision-making by their reference point, including the default rule that 
exists at the time they make their choice.329 By setting the default to a welfare-
enhancing option, we take advantage of this insight and make it much more 
likely that a person will make the welfare-enhancing choice.330 When employers 
automatically enroll their employees in savings plans (with an opt-out option), 
for instance, savings and enrollment increase significantly.331
Libertarian paternalism is paternalistic because it presumes to know what is 
best for individuals and attempts to direct behavior in ways consistent with that 
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understanding.332 It is libertarian because it does not aim to restrict behavior in 
the classic paternalistic sense. Instead, it relies on legal and organizational rules 
that encourage, without forcing, welfare-enhancing decision-making.333
Because behavioral findings suggest that people’s preferences are highly 
susceptible to outside influences, its champions argue that some form of 
paternalism is inevitable; given this, paternalism may as well be consciously 
employed in the service of welfare enhancement.334
Not surprisingly, my proposition has implications not only for bounded 
rationality theory, but also for libertarian paternalism and policy prescriptions 
more generally. An understanding of malleable rationality can help advance 
libertarian paternalist goals and avoid libertarian-paternalist-inspired 
interventions, which, due to the theory’s incomplete depiction of how policies 
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333 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 321, at 4–6.
334 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 323, at 1164. Libertarian paternalism is not without 
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1606. 
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affect decision-making capacity over time, might lead to unintended 
counterproductive results. When we better understand the decision-making 
capacity an actor brings to a given situation and how past laws and policies 
contributed to that capacity, we are better positioned to direct behaviors in 
welfare-enhancing ways. Here, I discuss three ways the insights of malleable
rationality can help us craft better laws and policies.
1. Identifying Target Populations for Nudging and Debiasing
Libertarian paternalists speak of ‘debiasing’—enacting laws and policies to 
counteract behavioral biases that lead to suboptimal decision-making335—and 
‘nudging’—enacting laws and policies that take advantage of behavioral biases 
to promote good decisions.336 An understanding of malleable rationality will 
help us with these tasks. In particular, it enables us to identify populations whose 
decision-making capacity departs from expectations in identifiable ways 
because they were subject to a particular policy in the past. This, in turn, allows 
us to target appropriate libertarian paternalistic interventions at these identified 
populations. It tells us who to focus scarce resources on, and gives us 
information about what needs to be done.
The insight that heightened impulse effects arise from impoverished 
backgrounds, for example, helps us by alerting us to the fact that populations 
growing up in poverty may be subject to these effects when making decisions 
about criminality.337 We now know there is a population at risk for heightened 
impulse effects, and we can take targeted measures to counter these effects. In 
a traditional libertarian paternalist scenario, this would be done by adopting one 
or more of a number of possible legal interventions that seek to reduce the 
negative effects of bounded rationality at the time of decision-making.338 Highly 
publicizing instances of criminal punishment to at-risk populations, for 
example, may make punishment more “available” to these populations and help 
counter their impulsivity when faced with the decision to commit a crime.339
Or, as Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler also suggest, increasing the certainty of 
punishment, but limiting the duration of that punishment, might most efficiently 
create deterrence effects in populations subject to self-control problems, since 
these populations are subject to hyperbolic discounting and may be more 
swayed by a high risk of punishment than by a lower risk of a more severe 
punishment.340
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2. Understanding the Limits of Nudging and Debiasing and Revealing 
Alternative Approaches
Though the insights of malleable rationality can help us identify target 
populations for nudging and debiasing, they can also alert us to situations where 
debiasing and nudging might in fact not work as expected. In these situations, 
employing these traditional libertarian paternalistic interventions would be 
wasteful at best.
For example, the study showing that children having positive interactions 
with a loveable cereal-selling cartoon character exhibited biased health 
evaluations of the cereal as adults also found that these biases were very hard to 
overcome, even when traditional debiasing techniques were used.341 This is 
thought to be in part due to the resilient nature of biases and associations 
acquired in childhood.342 What this tells us is that in this particular situation, 
and perhaps others like it, debiasing might in fact not be very effective. It would 
therefore be wasteful to enact policies trying to debias populations who, because 
of their earlier experiences, have biases that are resistant to such interventions. 
If we think it is welfare enhancing for people to make autonomous consumer 
choices, or alternatively, to make healthy food consumption choices, we need to 
think of an alternative approach.
Luckily, the insights of malleable rationality provide this alternative. 
Malleable rationality is all about how decision-making capacity changes over 
time in response to earlier policies. It thus—in contrast to libertarian 
paternalism, which focuses almost exclusively on interventions that take place 
at the time of decision-making343—reveals a new temporal target for 
intervention: the earlier point in time when the policy that first modified 
decision-making capacity was enacted. In the advertising scenario, we may not 
be able to do much by way of debiasing by the time people with entrenched
biases are making decisions about which cereal to buy.344 But we can target the 
policy that facilitated the formation of those biases in the first place. We might 
choose, for example, to limit the extent to which advertisers can market to 
children using fanciful characters like Ronald McDonald or animals with 
human-like traits—characters with whom children develop strong and long-
lasting emotional attachments,345 and whose presence in food marketing leads 
children to experience the advertised foods as better tasting.346 Another possible 
intervention would be to limit the degree to which advertisers can intentionally 
use a targeted child’s peers to market their products and services, since peer 
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evaluations and endorsements have been shown to greatly influence a child’s
long-term perception of a product.347 Rather than focusing on countering the 
negative effects of a bias at a later time, when those negative effects manifest 
themselves through decision-making, an understanding of malleable rationality 
allows us to target, and perhaps prevent, the formation of the bias in the first 
place. 
This insight applies equally to those situations where debiasing and nudging 
at the time of decision-making may in fact prove to be effective. In the case of 
enhanced impulse effects arising from an impoverished background, for 
example, I discussed two behavioral-economics-inspired interventions designed 
to influence the decision-making of an actor at the moment she is faced with a 
choice to commit a crime.348 But the insights of malleable rationality suggest 
that we have another set of alternatives: interventions that target the undesirable 
changes to decision-making capacity, either before these changes occur, or 
before they have a chance to be tested in the moment of choice. 
As for the former, if we think that the consequences of poverty on criminal 
decision-making are detrimental enough to justify the costs, we could target the 
earlier policy that is contributing to the harmful expression of bounded 
rationality in the first place—in this case, a defunding of social welfare 
programs that led to increased poverty. By changing the policy that led to 
detrimental effects on decision-making, we need no longer worry about 
countering these effects at a later time through debiasing or other behavioral-
law-and-economics-inspired techniques.
As for the latter, we might choose to undertake early interventions aimed at 
reducing impulsivity in the at-risk population in the long-term. Thus, though 
children growing up in poverty may indeed be subject to greater impulse effects 
as a result of their upbringing, we could target members of this population before 
they are faced with a decision to commit a crime with interventions designed to 
reverse the detrimental brain changes that led to these effects. Scientists are 
currently exploring various approaches for accomplishing this very goal.349
3. Avoiding Unintended Consequences
Finally, an understanding of malleable rationality can open our eyes to 
unintended and perhaps detrimental effects of unrelated (or even related) 
policies for welfare-enhancing goals. In the criminal law context, policies 
contributing to impoverishment and exposure to violent media in childhood lead 
to long-lasting brain changes that are detrimental from a criminal deterrence 
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(and arguably broader social welfare) perspective.350 And in advertising law, 
policies undertaken in the service of consumer autonomy may actually 
undermine the expression of autonomy in the long term.351 In these cases, a 
policy maker may need to address the unrelated policy to ensure her goals are 
met.
But apart from these examples, the phenomenon of malleable rationality 
raises the possibility that even policy interventions intentionally undertaken for 
the libertarian paternalist purpose of enhancing welfare may have long-lasting, 
unanticipated, and detrimental effects on the decision-making capacity of those 
subject to them. An effort to publicize law enforcement efforts in order to 
counter enhanced impulsivity through the availability heuristic,352 for example, 
may also have unanticipated, and undesirable, effects on the rationality of 
targeted actors. If the publicity surrounding criminal enforcement focuses on 
crimes perpetrated by racial minorities, the result may be the long-lasting 
instilment or reinforcement of harmful racial stereotypes.353 This could lead to 
welfare-diminishing outcomes in other situations, like the increased use of racial 
profiling tactics by law enforcement354 or more violence against minority 
populations that is ultimately found to be legally justified under self-defense 
doctrines.355 If a libertarian paternalist’s goal is to enhance welfare overall by 
taking advantage of bounded rationality, this goal will be undermined to the 
extent she fails to recognize the potentially long-lasting and harmful effects on 
rationality her own efforts might trigger. An understanding of malleable
rationality will help her avoid these harmful consequences. 
V. CONCLUSION
Neoclassical law and economics has given us a valuable tool for describing 
human behavior and crafting legal rules to channel this behavior in efficient 
directions. Behavioral law and economics gives us a more nuanced view of the 
human as decision-maker, and in this way helps us craft laws and policies that 
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are better able to meet the needs of real people living in real societies. But both 
neoclassical and behavioral law and economics have heretofore ignored a 
crucial point: that laws and policies change the people who are subject to them. 
Rationality, whether neoclassical or bounded, is not static. It changes over time 
as we live through experiences that are dictated in part by the laws and policies 
of our governments.
In at least some instances, we can identify through psychology and 
neuroscience studies how specific policies will affect future decision-making. 
Here, I offer three examples—one drawn from advertising law and two from 
criminal law—where the consequences of a specific policy for future decision-
making are profound. If we want to avoid unintended consequences and are 
serious about crafting legal systems in ways that enhance welfare, we must start 
taking the malleable nature of rationality into account.

